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Abstract
This thesis studies the role of the financial system in the amplification and propagation of business
cycles.
Chapter 1 studies the origin and propagation of balance sheet recessions. I first show that
in standard models driven by TFP shocks, the balance sheet channel disappears when agents are
allowed to write contracts on the aggregate state of the economy. In contrast, I show how uncertainty
shocks can drive balance sheet recessions with depressed asset prices and growth, and trigger a
"flight to quality" event with low interest rates and high risk-premia. Uncertainty shocks create
an endogenous hedging motive that induces financial intermediaries to take on a disproportionate
fraction of aggregate risk, even when contracts can be written on the aggregate state of the economy.
Finally, I explore some implications for financial regulation.
Chapter 2 studies a tractable model of dynamic moral hazard with purely pecuniary private
benefits. The agent can trade a productive asset and secretly divert funds to a private account
and use them to "recontract": at any time he can offer a new continuation contract to the prin-
cipal, who accepts if the new contract is attractive. The main result is that the optimal contract
can be characterized as the solution to a standard portfolio problem with a simple "skin in the
game" constraint. The setting places few restrictions on preferences and the distribution of shocks,
distinguishes between (observable) aggregate shocks and (unobservable) idiosyncratic shocks, and
takes arbitrary general equilibrium prices as given. This makes the results easily applicable to many
macro and financial applications.
Chapter 3 explores under what conditions the presence of moral hazard can create a balance
sheet amplification channel. If the private action of the agent exposes him to aggregate risk through
his unobserved private benefit, the optimal contract will try to over-expose him to aggregate risk
to deter him from misbehaving. This creates a tradeoff between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk-
sharing. More productive agents naturally want to leverage more and therefore have larger incentives
to distort their aggregate risk-sharing in order to reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. In
equilibrium, therefore, more productive agents take on a disproportionate fraction of aggregate risk,
creating a balance sheet channel.
Thesis Supervisor: Ivan Werning
Title: Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Uncertainty Shocks and Balance Sheet
Recessions
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has underscored the importance of the financial system in the transmission
and amplification of aggregate shocks. During normal times, the financial system helps allocate
resources to their most productive use, and provides liquidity and risk sharing services to the
economy. During crises, however, excessive exposure to aggregate risk by leveraged agents can lead
to. balance sheet recessions.' Small shocks will be amplified when these leveraged agents lose net
worth and become less willing or able to hold assets, depressing asset prices and growth. And since
it takes time for balance sheets to be rebuilt, transitory shocks can become persistent slumps. While
we have a good understanding of why balance sheets matter in an economy with financial frictions,
we don't have a good explanation for why agents are so exposed to aggregate risk in the first place. 2
The answer to this question is important not only for understanding the balance sheet channel, but
also for the design of effective financial regulation. In this paper I show that uncertainty shocks can
help explain the apparently excessive exposure to aggregate risk that drives balance sheet recessions.
In order to understand agents' aggregate risk-sharing decisions, I derive financial frictions from a
standard moral hazard problem. I allow them to write optimal contracts on all observable variables,
and I find that the type of structural shock hitting the economy takes on a prominent role. The
first contribution of this paper is to show that in standard models of balance sheet recessions driven
by TFP shocks, the balance sheet channel completely disappears when agents are allowed to write
'The idea of balance sheet recessions goes back to Fisher (1933) and, more recently, Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Several papers make the empirical case for balance sheet effects, such as Sraer,
Chaney, and Thesmar (2011), Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2011) and Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007).
2In standard models of balance sheet recessions such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), or more recently Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2011), or Kiyotaki, Gertler, and
Queralto (2011) agents face ad-hoc constraints on their ability to share aggregate risk. Krishnamurthy (2003) and
Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2012) also tackle the question of why agents don't insure against aggregate risk.
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contracts contingent on the observable aggregate state of the economy. Optimal contracts break the
link between leverage and aggregate risk sharing, and eliminate the excessive exposure to aggregate
risk that drives balance sheet recessions. As a result, balance sheets play no role in the transmission
and amplification of aggregate shocks. Furthermore, these contracts are simple to implement using
standard financial instruments such as equity and a market index. In fact, the balance sheet channel
vanishes as long as agents can trade a simple market index. The intuition behind this result goes
beyond the particular environment in this model.
The second contribution is to show that, in contrast to standard TFP shocks, uncertainty shocks
can create balance sheet recessions, even when contracts can be written on the aggregate state of
the economy. I introduce an aggregate uncertainty shock that increases idiosyncratic risk in the
economy, and show it generates an endogenous hedging motive that induces agents to take on
aggregate risk. Balance sheets therefore amplify the effects of the initial shock, depressing growth
and asset prices. The balance sheet channel in turn amplifies the hedging motive, inducing agents to
take even more aggregate risk in a two-way feedback loop. In addition, an increase in idiosyncratic
risk leads to an endogenous increase in aggregate risk, and triggers a "flight to quality" event with
low interest rates and high risk premia.
I use a continuous-time growth model similar to the Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He
and Krishnamurthy (2011) models of financial crises (BS and HK respectively). I derive financial
frictions from a moral hazard problem, and I allow agents write contracts on all observable variables.3
The continuous-time setting makes the problem tractable and allows for clean solutions. The results
of this paper are driven by the interaction between optimal contracts and the general equilibrium.
There are two types of agents: experts who can trade and use capital to produce, and consumers
who finance them. Experts can continuously trade capital, which is exposed to both aggregate and
(expert-specific) idiosyncratic Brownian TFP shocks. They want to raise funds from consumers and
share risk with them, but they face a moral hazard problem that imposes an "equity" constraint:
experts must keep a fraction of their equity to deter them from diverting funds to a private account.
This limits their ability to share idiosyncratic risk, and imposes a cost to leverage. The more
capital an expert buys, the more idiosyncratic risk he must carry on his balance sheet. Experts will
therefore require a higher excess return on capital when their balance sheets are weak, and thus
their balance sheets will affect the economy.
When contracts are constrained and cannot be written on the aggregate state of the economy,
experts are mechanically exposed to aggregate risk through the capital they hold, and any aggregate
shock that depresses the value of assets will have a large impact on their balance sheets. In contrast,
when contracts can be written on the aggregate state of the economy, the decision of how much
capital to buy (leverage) is separated from aggregate risk sharing, and optimal contracts hedge
the (endogenously) stochastic investment possibility sets provided by the market. In equilibrium,
3 BS and HK also derive financial frictions from a similar contracting problem, but they impQse constraints on
the contract space that limit agents ability to share aggregate risk.
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aggregate risk sharing is governed by the hedging motive of experts relative to consumers. Brownian
TFP shocks don't have a direct effect on investment possibility sets and hence don't generate
a hedging motive. Experts and consumers therefore share aggregate risk proportionally to their
wealth, so balance sheets don't induce a hedging motive either. In equilibrium, TFP shocks have
only a direct impact on output, but are not amplified through balance sheets and do not affect the
price of capital, growth rate of the economy or the financial market.
In addition to TFP shocks, the economy is hit by an aggregate uncertainty shock that increases
idiosyncratic risk for all experts. In contrast to Brownian TFP shocks, uncertainty shocks create
an endogenous hedging motive that induces experts to choose a large exposure to aggregate risk,
and underlies the balance sheet amplification channel. The intuition is as follows. Downturns are
periods of high uncertainty, with endogenously depressed asset prices and high risk premia. During
downturns, experts who invest in these assets and receive the risk premia are relatively better off,
in comparison to consumers. On the one hand, this creates a substitution effect: if experts are
risk-neutral, they will prefer to have more net worth during downturns in order to get more bang
for the buck. This effect works against the balance sheet channel, since it induces experts to insure
against aggregate risk. On the other hand, experts require more net worth during booms in order
to achieve a given level of utility. This creates a wealth effect: risk averse experts will prefer to have
more net worth during booms. I argue the empirically relevant case is the one in which the wealth
effect dominates 4 the substitution effect, and drives the balance sheet amplification channel.
Asset prices and risk premia, however, are endogenous and depend, among other things, on
experts' balance sheets. After an uncertainty shock, experts' balance sheets will be weak, reducing
their willingness to hold capital and further depressing asset prices and growth. This amplifies the
hedging motive, inducing experts to take even more aggregate risk ex-ante. Equilibrium is a fixed
point of this two-way feedback between aggregate risk sharing and endogenous hedging motives.
The continuous-time setup allows me to characterize the equilibrium as the solution to a system
of partial differential equations, and analyze the full equilibrium dynamics instead of linearizing
around a steady state. It also makes results comparable to the asset pricing literature.
Furthermore, I show that these uncertainty shocks are equivalent to an exogenous shock to the
degree of moral hazard (how efficient experts are at stealing capital). this translates directly into
a tightening of the financial constraints. I will call these shocks "financial shocks" for short. The
intuition for this result is as follows. In an economy without financial frictions idiosyncratic risk
shouldn't matter, since it can be aggregated away. Moral hazard, however, forces agents to keep a
fraction of the idiosyncratic risk in their capital. It is immaterial to them whether they must keep
a constant fraction of more idiosyncratic risk, or a larger fraction of a constant idiosyncratic risk.
Although uncertainty shocks and financial shocks are isomorphic within the model, they might follow
different stochastic processes. I also solve the model with a stochastic process more appropriate for
4 The wealth effect dominates when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is larger than 1 (agents are more risk
averse than log).
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financial shocks.
A possible concern with an optimal contracts approach is that they might require very complex
and unrealistic financial arrangements. I show this is not the case. Optimal contracts can be
implemented in a complete financial market with minimal informational requirements. Experts can
be allowed to invest, consume, and manage their portfolios, subject only to an equity constraint. In
fact, the TFP-neutrality result does not require the financial market to be complete. It is enough
that it spans the aggregate return to capital. A market index of experts' equity accomplishes
precisely this. As long as experts and consumers can trade a market index, the balance sheet
channel disappears in the Brownian TFP benchmark.
There are several lessons for financial regulation. First, the results in this paper suggest regula-
tion should focus on experts' exposure to aggregate risk instead of their leverage. Limiting leverage
is costly because it prevents capital from going to the most efficient users, and is related to idiosyn-
cratic risk taking. There may be good reasons to regulate idiosyncratic risk taking by, for example,
financial institutions that are considered too big to fail5 . But inasmuch as we care about the health
of the aggregate financial sector, it is useful to keep in mind the distinction between leverage and
aggregate risk sharing. Second, experts may actually have good reasons to take on aggregate risk.
I show that, while the competitive equilibrium is not constrained efficient, a policy of regulating
experts' exposure to aggregate risk in order to completely eliminate the balance sheet channel is
not optimal either. The same uncertainty shocks that help explain agents' aggregate risk sharing
behavior also affect the planner's problem. Optimal financial regulation must take into account
how optimal contracts endogenously respond to policy, not only through direct regulation, but also
through the indirect dependence of optimal contracts on the general equilibrium.
Literature Review. This paper fits within the literature on the balance sheet channel going back
to the seminal works of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). It is most closely related to the more recent Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2011). The main difference with these papers is that
I allow agents to write contracts on all observable variables, including the aggregate state of the
economy. Krishnamurthy (2003) is the first paper to point out the importance of risk-sharing for
the balance sheet channel. He finds that when agents are able to trade state-contingent assets, the
amplification mechanism through asset prices in KM disappears. 6 He then shows the feedback
from asset prices to experts' balance sheets reappears when limited commitment on consumers'
side is introduced: if consumers also need collateral to credibly promise to make payments during
downturns, they might be constrained in their ability to share aggregate risk with experts. This
mechanism is similar to the one in Holmstrom and Tirole (1996). The limited commitment on
5 Even if we care about the aggregate financial sector, there may be practical reason to focus on leverage, as
Haldane (2012), for example, argues
"Experts might still be overexposed to aggregate risk in his model because they must chose between sharing
aggregate risk and raising funds up front. A similar tradeoff is explored by Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2012).
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the consumers' side is only binding, however, when experts as a whole need fresh cash infusions
from consumers. Typically, debt reductions are enough to provide the necessary aggregate risk
sharing, and evade consumers' limited commitment (experts' debt can play the role of collateral for
consumers). Cooley, Quadrini, and Marimon (2004) limit aggregate insurance with limited contract
enforceability. After a positive shock raises entrepreneurs' outside option, their continuation utility
must also go up to keep them from walking away. This relaxes the contractual problem going
forward and propagates even transitory aggregate shocks. The effect, however, is asymmetric:
negative shocks to entrepreneurs outside option are not amplified in the same way as positive ones.
In contrast to these papers, I don't constrain agents' ability to share aggregate risk. The continuous-
time setting allows agents to leverage and share aggregate risk freely as long as they are not up
against their solvency constraint.
Kiyotaki, Gertler, and Queralto (2011) also also tackle the question of why banks' balance sheets
are so highly exposed to aggregate risk, and focus on the debt vs. equity tradeoff for banks, while
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) build a model of financial crises where experts use long-term debt
and face a time-varying leverage constraint. Here, instead, I don't impose an asset structure on
agents.7 Geanakoplos (2009) emphasizes the role of heterogeneous beliefs. More optimistic agents
place a higher value on assets and are naturally more exposed to aggregate risk. The balance
sheet channel in my model, in contrast, does not rely on heterogenous beliefs. Experts take on more
aggregate risk in order to take advantage of endogenous investment possibility sets. Myerson (2012),
on the other hand, builds a model of credit cycles allowing long-term contracts with a similar moral
hazard problem to the one in this paper. In his model the interaction of different generations of
bankers can generate endogenous credit cycles, even without aggregate shocks. Shleifer and Vishny
(1992) and Diamond and Rajan (2011) look at the liquidation value of assets during fire sales, and
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) focus on the endogenous determination of margin constraints.
Several papers make the empirical case for the balance sheet amplification channel. Sraer,
Chaney, and Thesmar (2011), for example, use local variation in real estate prices to identify
the impact of firm collateral on investment. They find each extra dollar of collateral increases
investment by $0.06. Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) provide evidence for balance
sheet effects in asset pricing. They show that the marginal investor in mortgage-backed securities
is a specialized intermediary, instead of a diversified representative agent. Adrian, Etula, and Muir
(2011) use shocks to the leverage of securities broker-dealers to construct an "intermediary SDF"
and use it to explain asset returns. At the same time, there has been a lot of recent interest in the
role of uncertainty shocks in business cycles. Bloom (2009) and, more recently, Bloom, Floetotto,
Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012) build a model where higher volatility leads to the
postponement of investment and hiring decisions, and show that uncertainty shocks can do a good
job matching the empirical time series8 . More related to the model in this paper, Christiano, Motto,
7 In Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) experts are also risk-neutral and trade with risk-averse consumers.
80n the other hand, Bachmann and Moscarini (2011) argue that causation may run in the opposite direction,
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and Rostagno (2012) introduce shocks to idiosyncratic risk in a model with financial frictions and
incomplete contracts. They fit the model to U.S. data and find this uncertainty shock to be the
most important factor driving business cycles9 . Angeletos (2006) studies the effects of uninsurable
idiosyncratic capital risk on aggregate savings. In the asset pricing literature, Campbell, Giglio,
Polk, and Turley (2012) introduce a volatility factor into an ICAPM asset pricing model. They
find this volatility factor can help explain the growth-value spread in expected returns. Bansal and
Yaron (2004) study aggregate shocks to the growth rate and volatility of the economy, and Bansal,
Kiku, Shaliastovich, and Yaron (2012) study a dynamic asset pricing model with cash flow, discount
rate and volatility shocks. Idiosyncratic risk, in particular, is studied by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001). Eggertsson and Krugman (2010), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) and Buera and
Moll (2012) also consider exogenous shocks to financial frictions.
I embed optimal contracts in a general equilibrium setup. Sannikov (2008) studies optimal dy-
namic contracts in a continuous-time setting. With a purely pecuniary private benefit, however, if
agents could commit to long-term contracts that control their consumption, the moral hazard prob-
lem would vanish. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) make the agent's consumption unobservable and
obtain an "equity" constraint for the linear preferences case. Instead, I introduce re-contracting.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) consider a similar environment and extend it to consider in-
termediaries and Poison processes. He and Krishnamurthy (2011) use a discrete-time limit and
obtain the same optimal contract. Both rule out contracts on the aggregate state of the economy,
however. Strulovici (2011) also considers renegotiation-proof contracts in a continuous-time set-
ting. DeMarzo, He, Fishman, and Wang (2012) show how optimal contracts can punish agents for
outcomes for which they are not responsible. As in this paper, moral hazard itself does not limit
aggregate risk sharing, but introduces a "hedging motive" that wouldn't exist in the absence of
moral hazard.
The intuition behind experts' exposure to uncertainty shocks is related to ICAPM models going
back to Merton (1973). Even though moral hazard does not restrict agents' ability to share aggregate
risk, it makes investment possibility sets endogenously stochastic and introduces a relative hedging
motive for aggregate risk sharing that wouldn't be present without moral hazard. In contrast to
ICAPM models, here there's a feedback from agents' risk sharing back into investment possibility
sets, through their balance sheets.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 I introduce the setup of
the model and the contractual environment. In Section 1.3 I characterize the equilibrium using a
recursive formulation, and study the different effects of TFP and uncertainty shocks. I also solve the
model with financial shocks. Section 1.4 looks at financial regulation. Section 1.5 explores several
with downturns inducing higher risk.
OFernAndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramfrez (2010) study the impact of uncertainty shocks in standard macroeco-
nomic models, and FernAndez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Guerron-Quintana, and Uribe (2011) look at the impact
of volatility of international interest rates on small open economies.
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extensions. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The model
The model purposefully builds on Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy
(2011), adding idiosyncratic risk and general EZ preferences to their framework. As in those papers,
I derive financial frictions endogenously from a moral hazard problem. In contrast to those papers,
however, contracts can be written on all observable variables.
1.2.1 Setup
Technology. Consider an economy populated by two types of agents: "experts" and "consumers",
identical in every respect except that experts are able to use capital' 0 . There are two goods,
consumption and capital. Denote by kt the aggregate "efficiency units" of capital in the economy,
and by ki,t the individual holdings of an expert i E [0, 1], where t E [0, oo) is time. An expert can
use capital to produce a flow of consumption goods
yi,t = (a - t (gi,t)) ki,t
The function t with t' > 0, t" > 0 represents a standard investment technology with adjustment
costs: in order to achieve a growth rate g for his capital stock, the expert must invest a flow of t (g)
consumption goods. The capital he holds evolves"
dkit = gi,tdt + o-dZt + vtdWi,t (1.1)
ki,t
where Z = {Zt E Rd;.Ft, t > 0} is an aggregate brownian motion, and W =- {Wi,t; hF, t > 0} an
idiosyncratic brownian motion for expert i, in a probability space (Q, P, T) equipped with a filtration
{ t } with the usual conditions. The aggregate shock can be multidimensional, d > 1, so the economy
could be hit by many aggregate shocks. For most results, however, there is no loss from taking
d = 1 and focusing on a single aggregate shock". While the exposure of capital to aggregate risk
- > 0 E Rd is constant1 3 , its exposure to idiosyncratic risk vt > 0 follows an exogenous stochastic
'
0 We could allow consumers to use capital less productively, as in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) or Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). I explore this setup in section 1.5.
"This formulation where capital is exposed to aggregate risk is equivalent to a standard growth model where
TFP at follows a Brownian Motion. Then if nt is physical capital, kt = atnt is "effective capital". To preserve scale
invariance we must also have investment costs proportional to effective capital kt, which makes sense if we think
investment requires diverting capital from consumption to investment (or in a richer model with labor).
1 2This is in fact the approach I take when computing numerical solutions.
131 will use the convention that a is a row vector, while Zt a column vector. Throughout the paper I will not point
this out unless it's necessary for clarity.
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process
dvt = A(P -vt)dt + av iedZ (1.2)
where F1 is the long-run mean and A the mean reversion parameter 14 . The loading of the idiosyncratic
volatility of capital on aggregate risk o, < 0 so that we may think of Z as a "good" aggregate shock
that increases the effective capital stock and reduces idiosyncratic risk. This is just a naming
convention. With multiple aggregate shocks, d > 1, we may take some shocks to be pure TFP
shocks with or, 0, other pure uncertainty shocks with a') = 0, and yet other mixed shocks.
Preferences. Both experts and consumers have Epstein-Zin preferences with the same discount
rate p, risk aversion -f and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) #-1. If we let -y = we
get the standard CRRA utility case as a special case.
Ut=-Et e-0CU~~[fte ~<u]
Epstein-Zin preferences separate risk-aversion from the EIS, which play different roles in the balance
sheet amplification channel. They are defined recursively (see Duffie and Epstein (1992)):
Ut = Et f (cu, U) dul (1.3)
where
1 pci-p ~(f (C, U)=-p(1-)U
[(1 -) U]1-,
I will later also introduce turnover among experts in order to obtain a non-degenerate stationary
distribution for the economy. Experts will retire with independent Poisson arrival rate r and become
consumers. There is no loss in intuition from taking r = 0 for most of the results, however.
Markets. Experts can trade capital continuously at a competitive price pt > 0, which we conjec-
ture follows an Ito process:
dpt
Pt= pp,tdt + op,tdZtPt
The price of capital depends on the aggregate shock Z but not on the idiosyncratic shocks {Wi}LE[o,,p
and it's determined endogenously in equilibrium. The total value of the aggregate capital stock is
ptkt and it constitutes the total wealth of the economy, since this is the only real asset.
"If 2AP > o , this Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process is always strictly positive and has a long-run distribution with mean
14
There is also a complete financial market 1 5 with SDF jt:
dt 
-rtdt 
- 7rtdZt
7t
Here rt is the risk-free interest rate and rt the price of aggregate risk Z. Both are determined
endogenously in equilibrium. I am already using the fact that idiosyncratic risks {Wi} ico,j] have
price zero in equilibrium because they can be aggregated away.
Consumers' Problem. Consumers face a standard portfolio problem. They cannot hold capital
but they have access to a complete financial market. They start with wealth wo derived from
ownership of a fraction of aggregate capital (which they immediately sell to experts). Taking the
aggregate process 7j as given, they solve the following problem.
Definition 1. Consumers' problem:
Uo = max [ f (ct, Ut) dt
(c'U.) [o
st : dwt = (rt + o-w,tirt - 6t) dt + a-,tdZt
Wt
where Ut is defined recursively as in 1.3, and a solvency constraint wt > 0.
I use w for the wealth of consumers, and reserve n for experts', which I will call "net worth".
Consumers get the risk free interest rate on their wealth, plus a premium 7rt for the exposure to
aggregate risk or,, they chose to take. The hat on denotes the variable is normalized by wealth.
Since the price of expert-specific idiosyncratic risks {Wi} is zero in equilibrium, consumers will never
buy idiosyncratic risk. This is already baked into consumers' dynamic budget constraint.
1.2.2 Contracting Environment
Experts face a more complex problem. Similarly to consumers, experts can participate in the fi-
nancial market. In addition, they can continuously trade and use capital for production. However,
they face a moral hazard problem that creates a financial friction. In the interest of brevity, here
I provide an overview of the contractual environment and the main characterization results. Ap-
pendix A develops the contracting environment in more detail. Throughout this section, the general
equilibrium prices p and q are taken as given. To simplify notation, I suppress the reference i to
the expert.
Each expert has a bank balance bt, with initial net worth no > 0. He wants to raise funds to
buy capital and share risk, but he faces a moral hazard problem. He can divert capital to a private
1 5 A complete financial market could be implemented with different asset structures. For example, a natural asset
structure would include risk-free debt, equity in each expert's investments and d market indices to span Z. If d 1
we can do with only one market index.
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account at a rate s = {st; t > 0} and obtain # E (0, 1) units of capital per unit diverted, so stealing
is inefficient and we always want to implement no stealing s = 0. His cumulative hidden savings St
then follow1 6 dSt = #ptktstdt + Strtdt. The parameter # captures the severity of the moral hazard:
the more efficient stealing is for the expert, the tighter the moral hazard problem becomes. With
# = 0 moral hazard disappears. The observable cumulative return from investing a dollar in capital
is Rk - {4; t > 0}, with
dRk= gt + fpp,t + oc ,t + a-t(g)- st dt + (o +ap,t) dZt +vdW
Pt
t~ [d~fl
The expert expects to gain from growth in the value of his capital 7 plus the output flow a - t (gt).
When he steals st he reduces the observable return of his investment. Of course, he gains #stdt
in hidden savings per dollar invested in capital. His observable return is exposed to aggregate risk
both exogenously from his capital a and endogenously from its market price op,t, and to his own
idiosyncratic risk Wi only through capital, with loading Vt.
He designs a contract (e, g, k, F) that specifies his consumption et 0, investment gt, capital
kt 0, and a cumulative cash flow"8 F he will sell on the financial market, all adapted to the
filtration {Rt} generated by the observable variables19 Z and {R} iE[o 11. For now, let (e, g, k, F)
be all contractible, as well as b. I will later relax this assumption. Under this contract the bank
balance of the expert evolves:
dbt = rtbtdt + ptkt (de - rtdt) - dFt - etdt (1.4)
The expert is interested in maximizing his expected utility Uo, given by (1.3), and the market
prices the cash flow F. At time t, the continuation of the contract has present value
Jt = EQio *',t d F,J-E [[Bt 10u
.Lt Bo, F,
where Bo,t = exp (fo rudu is the value of risk free bond, the expectation is taken under the
equivalent martingale measure2 o Q, and under no stealing, s = 0. The contract can only be sold if
Jo > 0. To make the problem well defined, we impose a solvency constraint. The expert must have
1Hidden savings are invested in the risk-free asset.
1
7 The term ou',,t captures the covariance between the expert's capital stock and the market price of capital.
18F is an Rt-adapted semimartingale, and is the most general process the market can price.
"The general equilibrium processes p and i? are also adapted to 'Ht because they only depend on the aggregate
shocks Z. Also, even though the contract could in principle depend on other experts' returns, it is wlog to write it
only on each expert's own observable return.
2
"There is a one-to-one relationship between the state price density 7t and the equivalent martingale measure Q.
See Karatzas and Shreve (1998), pages 17-19.
16
in his bank account enough funds to cover the continuation value of his contract21 : b - Jt > 0.
Define nt = bt - Jt + St as the expert's "net worth". In equilibrium, where no stealing occurs and
St = 0, we have nt = bt - jt.
Re-contracting. As in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2011), I
introduce re-contracting 22 . At any time t, the expert is committed to a single contract. However,
he cannot commit to long term contracts. The expert can at any time settle his obligations and
roll-over the contract. The expert cannot "run away" without paying, as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), but he can offer a new contract (c', g', k', F') with present value J' Jt, using his hidden
savings St. Re-contracting allows the expert to use diverted funds St optimally, not only for hidden
consumption but also for investment and risk sharing, and leads to a tractable "equity constraint"
implementation.
Characterization. We can characterize the optimal contract with re-contracting using the solu-
tion to a constrained portfolio problem, in the following sense. If we solve the constrained portfolio
problem, we can use the solution to build an optimal contract.
Proposition 2. The optimal contract with moral hazard and re-contracting can be characterized
with the constrained portfolio problem of Definition 3.
Definition 3. The expert's problem:
V0 = max ES=O f (et, Vt) dt
where Vt is defined recursively as in 1.3, subject to the dynamic budget constraint for his net worth
nt
dn= [p,t - et| dt + a-n,tdZt + &rn,,tdWt (1.5)
nt
=rt + ptk (E*- [dE R - rt) - (1 - ptk (a + ap,t) irt + Otlrt
O-n,t = tptkt (a + ap,t) + Ct (1.6)
-n,t = tptktvt
and a solvency constraint nt > 0.
2 1A lower bound for bt - Jt is required to make the problem well defined.
22With commitment to long-term contracts, it is possible to implement the first best contract without moral
hazard. An alternative to re-contracting is to make consumption non-contractible, as in DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006) or Myerson (2012).
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The hat denotes the variable is divided by nt, i.e. kt = k. The expert chooses his consumption
8, investment g, capital holdings k, and a free process Ot which plays an important role and will be
explained below. The expert's net worth nt has an expected growth rate A,t before consumption,
and is exposed to both aggregate risk through an,t, and idiosyncratic risk through &n,t. Due to
re-contracting, the expert's continuation utility depends on his net worth nt. To provide incentives
for the expert to not steal, his net worth must be exposed to his observable return R with a loading
kt of at least #. That is, he must have "skin in the game". The intuition for this local IC constraint
is that if the expert steals one dollar, he gets # dollars into his private account, but loses et > #
dollars because his net worth is exposed to his observable return R, which diminishes when he
steals. This constraint is always binding, so we may take qt = #.
The expression for &n,t says that the expert's net worth is exposed to his own idiosyncratic risk
W through the fraction kt # of his return ptktdI he keeps, which has a loading of Vt on W.
The expert's investment in capital also exposes him to aggregate risk, etptkt (a + ap,t). However,
he gets an additional free process {t E Rd; t > 0} which allows him to separate his leverage ptkt
from his aggregate risk sharing on,t:
crn,t = Otptkt (a + up,t) + Ot
We can interpret Ot as the portfolio investment in a set of market indices with gain Mt E Rd,
normalized for simplicity with identity loading on the aggregate shock Z:
d M rt + i~))dt + dZ() j=1...d
The equation for At says he gets a risk free return rt on his net worth plus the excess return of
capital for his investment ptkt. In addition, since he is keeping exposure et to his own observable
return, he is offloading an exposure 1- et onto the market. His observable return is exposed to both
aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. The market doesn't price idiosyncratic risk, but it does demand a
premium for the aggregate risk, so the expert must pay (1 - Pt) ptkt (u + lp,t) rt. Finally, because
he also takes on aggregate risk through Ot, he gets a premium Otgrt.
Implementation. The characterization as a constrained portfolio problem suggests we can ac-
tually implement the optimal contract by allowing the expert to chose his own consumption e,
investment g, capital holdings k, and portfolio investments 0, subject only to an "equity constraint"
that guarantees he does not find it optimal to steal. Under this implementation, the expert keeps a
fraction # of the equity of a firm that holds the capital. The rest is held by outside investors. The
expert also borrows using risk-free debt and trades a market index that allows him to make the
liabilities of his firm contingent on the aggregate state of the economy. This implementation is not
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the only possibility, of course, and depends on the available instruments in the financial market2 3 .
Proposition 4. The optimal contract can be implemented as a portfolio problem in a complete
financial market, allowing the expert to freely trade capital, risk-free debt, market indices, and his
own equity subject to an equity constraint.
Balancesheet
Liailities
Inside Outside
equity equity
+1-p5
The informational requirements of this implementation are very low. The expert's net worth
must be minimally monitored to enforce the solvency constraint nt > 0, but not more so than in any
financial market.The equity constraint requires observing the expert's portfolio, but only regarding
the equity of his own project. It is not necessary to monitor the expert's consumption or investment
choices, or his portfolio choices beyond his own equity.
Constrained contracts. The free process 0 plays a crucial role, allowing the expert to separate
leverage ptkt from aggregate risk sharing. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krish-
namurthy (2011) consider a similar contracting environment. Both, however, impose constraints
on contracts that prevent experts from sharing aggregate risk, forcing Ot = 0 in (1.6). With this
constraint, leverage and aggregate risk sharing become entangled. If the expert wants to buy capital
he needs to accept a high exposure to aggregate risk.
-,t = Otptkt (a + ap,t) + 6t
=0
In contrast, I allow agents to write contracts on all observable variables, including aggregate
shocks Z hitting the economy. The optimal contract then uses Ot to separate the decision of how
much to leverage #ptkt, from the decision of how much aggregate risk to carry on,t. Intuitively,
23Notice that the expert does not necessarily invest all of his net worth into the equity of the firm. His net worth
could be more valuable than a fraction # of the equity of his firm.
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since the expert's private action does not interact with aggregate risk, there is no need to restrict
aggregate risk sharing for incentive provision purposes. Moral hazard limits experts' ability to share
idiosyncratic risk only.24
In general, we may consider contracts that can be implemented in an incomplete financial market
that spans a linear subspace of aggregate shocks Z = BZt where the matrix B E Rd'd has full
rank lower than the number of aggregate shocks (i.e. d' < d) in addition to the experts' observable
returns R k } . For example, instead of the full set of d orthogonal normalized market indices
MU), we only have a linear combination BM. We still solve the same constrained portfolio problem
3, with the added constraint2 5 that Ot = tB for some 0 E Rd': the portfolio investment in the
market indices must be in the row space of B. Now, however, the "skin in the game" constraint
bt # might not be always binding2 6
1.2.3 Equilibrium
Denote the set of experts I = [0, 1] and the set of consumers J = (1, 2]. We take the initial capital
stock Ko and its distribution among agents {ki}i } as given, with f ksdi + fE kJdj ko.
Let ki,o > 0 and ky,o > 0 so that all agents start with strictly positive net worth.
Definition 5. An equilibrium is a set of aggregate stochastic processes adapted to the filtration
generated by Z: the price of capital {pt }, the state price density {it}, and the aggregate capital stock
{kt}, and a set of stochastic processes for each expert i E I and each consumer j E J (each adapted
to their information27 ): net worth and wealth {ni,t, wj,t}, consumption {ei,t 0, cjt 0}, capital
holdings {ki,t}, investment {gi,t}, and aggregate risk sharing, {oui,n,, a,,,t}, such that:
1. Initial net worth satisfies no = poki and wealth w - pok.
2. Each expert and consumer solves his problem taking aggregate conditions as given.
3. Market Clearing:
fei,tdi + / ci,tdj + f, (gi,t) kz,tdi = faki,tdi
fki,tdi = kt
fc in,tni,tdi + j aj,w,twj,tdj = f ptki,t (o' + cp,t) di
2 4 This doesn't mean optimal contracts will not distort aggregate risk sharing. See DeMarzo, He, Fishman, and
Wang (2012) for a model where the contract punishes the agent for aggregate outcomes out of his control.
2 5 The setup in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) or He and Krishnamurthy (2011) has B = 0.
2For example, keeping exposure to his own return might be the only way for the expert to get exposure to
aggregate risk, even if it comes at the cost of some idiosyncratic risk.
2r The filtration generated by Z and Wi in the case of experts and only Z in the case of consumers
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4. Law of motion of aggregate capital:
dkt = (f ,tkjtdi) dt + ktadZt
The market clearing conditions for the consumer goods and capital market are standard. The
condition for market clearing in the financial market is derived as follows. We already know each
expert keeps a fraction # of his own equity. If we aggregate the equity sold on the market into
indices with identity loading on Z, there is a total supply of these indices (1 - #) ptkt (a + at,p).
Consumers absorb fJ ay,w,twj,tdj and experts fj O,tni,tdi of these indices. Rearranging we obtain
the expression above. By Walras' law, the market for risk-free debt clears automatically.
1.2.4 Benchmark without moral hazard
Without any financial frictions this is a standard AK growth model where balance sheets don't play
any role. Experts share all of their idiosyncratic risk, so the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks vt
is irrelevant and the economy settles on a stationary growth path. The price of capital and the
growth rate of the economy do not depend on experts' net worth: balance sheets are only relevant
to determine consumption of experts and consumers.
Proposition 6 (No moral hazard benchmark). If p - (1 - V/)g* + (1 - V) 2o,2 > 0 and without any
financial frictions, there is a stationary growth equilibrium, where the price of capital is p* and the
growth rate g*, given by:
t' (g*) = p* (1.7)
a - t(g*)
p-()g* + (1 -
.) 82)
1.3 Solving for the equilibrium
Experts and consumers face a dynamic problem, where their optimal decisions depend on the
stochastic investment possibility sets they face, captured by the price of capital p and the SDF
rj. The equilibrium is driven by the exogenous stochastic process for vt and by the endogenous
distribution of wealth between experts and consumers. The recursive EZ preferences generate
optimal strategies which are linear in net worth, and allow us to simplify the state-space: we only
need to keep track of the net worth of experts relative to the total value of assets which they must
hold in equilibrium, xt = ,. The distribution of net worth across experts, and of wealth across
consumers, is not important. The strategy is to use a recursive formulation of the problem and
look for a Markov equilibrium in (Vt, xt), taking advantage of the scale invariance property of the
economy which allows us to abstract from the level of the capital stock. The layout of this section
is as follows. First I recast the equilibrium in recursive form and characterize agents' optimal plans.
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I then study the effects of TFP shocks under different contractual environments. Finally, I solve
the full model with uncertainty shocks and a balance sheet channel.
1.3.1 Recursive Formulation
First, conjecture that the value function for an expert with net worth n takes the following power
form:
V ( t, n)
1 - -Y
I call process = {( > 0; t > 0} the "net worth multiplier". It captures the stochastic, general
equilibrium investment possibility set the expert faces (i.e.: does not depend on his own net worth
nt). When (t is high the expert is able to obtain a large amount of utility from a given amount of
net worth, as if his actual net worth was (ent. Conjecture that it follows an Ito process
= p,tdt + ag,tdZt
where Ig,t and og,,t must be determined in equilibrium. For consumers, the utility function takes
the same form, but instead of (t, we have (t as the "wealth multiplier", which follows -= tdt+
oCtdZt, also determined in equilibrium.
I use a dynamic programming approach to solve agents' problem. For experts, we have the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation after some algebra:
p1- '0___+ 2,2 2 2))On1.9)
- max !_ - ±I-e~L- &n+-(
1 - am pG,-I+ + + pe - ( a+o - 2(1 - -t)ono- +-)(19
subject to the dynamic budget constraint (1.6), and a transversality condition. Consumers have an
analogous HJB equation.
Proposition 7. [Linearity] Growth is determined by a static FOC
t' (gt) = pt
In addition, since net worth n (or wealth w in consumers' case) drops out of the HJB, all experts
chose the same et, gt, kt and Ot, and all consumers the same ^t and ow,t.
Proposition 7 tells us two important things. The first is that the growth rate of the economy is
linked to asset prices in a straightforward way. Anything that depresses asset prices will have a real
effect on the growth rate of the economy. For example, with a quadratic adjustment cost function
t (g) - Ag 2 , the growth rate of the economy is simply gt = 2.
Proposition 7 also tells us that policy functions are linear in net worth. This is a useful property
of EZ preferences' and allows us to abstract from the distribution of wealth across experts and
across consumers, and simplifies the state space of the equilibrium. We only need to keep track of
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the fraction of aggregate wealth that belongs to experts: xt = 7 E [0, 1). I look for a Markov
equilibrium with two state variables: the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks Vt, and xt:
pt = p(vt,xt), t = ve(t,xt), (t =C (Vt,xt), rt = r (vt,xt), rt = 7 (Vt,xt)
where p, ( and ( are conjectured to be twice continuously differentiable. The first state variable vt
evolves exogenously according to (1.2). The state variable xt is endogenous, and has an interpreta-
tion in terms of experts' balance sheets. Since experts must hold all the capital in the economy, the
denominator captures assets on experts' balance sheets. The numerator is the net worth of experts.
I will sometimes abuse notation and refer to xt as "experts' balance sheets".
We know from Proposition 6 that without moral hazard, experts would be able to offload all
of their idiosyncratic risk onto the market and hence neither vt nor xt would play any role in
equilibrium. In contrast, in an economy with financial frictions, # > 0, experts' balance sheets will
play an important role. We say balance sheets matter if equilibrium objects depend on x. In order
for balance sheets to play a role in the transmission and amplification of aggregate shocks, we also
need them to be exposed to aggregate shocks. In principle, x could be exposed to aggregate risk Z
through its volatility term ox,t, or through a stochastic drift ptx,t. In practice, what we usually mean
when we talk about a balance sheet channel is that experts' balance sheets are disproportionally hit
by aggregate shocks, so we want to focus on ot > 0. We say there is a balance sheet amplification
channel if balance sheets matter and, in addition, aot > 0 . For example, the total wealth in the
economy is ptkt, and it has an exposure to aggregate risk Z given by
vol (ptkt) = optkt + pvkto-vt + pxktox,t
TFP id. risk B.S. channel
So for a balance sheet channel we need both 1) px y 0 and 2) a,t > 0. The first condition says
balance sheets matter for the price of capital. The second conditions says balance sheets are exposed
to aggregate risk. Together they create a balance sheet channel. We can now give a definition for
a recursive equilibrium..
Definition 8. A Recursive Markov Equilibrium is a set of aggregate functions (p, , (, r, IT) (v, x)
and policy functions (8, g, k, 0) (v,x) for experts and (2, a,,t) (v, x) for consumers, and a law of
motion for the endogenous aggregate state variable dxt = px (v, x) dt + o-x (v, x) dZt such that:
1. and ( solve the experts' and consumers' HJB equations (1.9), and (,g,k,0) and (6, o-,t)
are the corresponding policy functions, taking (p, r, 7r) and the laws of motion of vt and xt as
given.
2. Market clearing:
&px+p(1-x) =a-t(g)
pkx=1
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Gnx + aw (1 - x) = o + a,
3. x follows the law of motion (1.10) derived using Ito's lemma:
dxt = px,tdt + ao,tdZt (1.10)
px,t = Xt (pn,t - et - gt - pp,t - at + (a + ap,t)2 - On (U + op,t)')
01Tt-Xt (0-n - Or - Up,t)
This recursive definition abstracts from the absolute level of the aggregate capital stock, which
we can recover using 'k = gtdt + adZt.
Capital holdings. Experts demand for capital is pinned down by the FOC from the HJB equa-
tion. After some algebra we obtain an expression that pins down the demand for capital k:
a -t
gt + pp't + aoi/t + a - rt < (0, + UP't) rt + _ptkt (#vt )2
Pt
Idiosyncratic risk is not priced in the financial market, because it can be aggregated away. However,
because experts face an equity constraint that forces them to keep an exposure # to the return of
their capital, they know that the more capital they hold, the more idiosyncratic risk they must bear
on their balance sheets &,,t = #ptktvt. They consequently demand a premium on capital for the
fraction # of idiosyncratic risk that cannot be shared. Using the equilibrium condition pkx = 1 we
obtain an equilibrium pricing equation for capital:
a-t 1 2gt + pp't + o'pt + a- - rt (O- + ap,t) Irt + 7-(#vt) (1.11)Pt Xt
excess return agg. risk premium id. risk premium
The left hand side is the excess return of capital. The right hand side is made up of the risk premium
corresponding to the aggregate risk capital carries, and a risk premium for the idiosyncratic risk
it carries. When experts balance sheets are weak (low xt) and idiosyncratic risk vt high, experts
demand a high premium on capital. This is how xt and Vt affect the economy, and we can see that
without moral hazard, # = 0, neither xt nor vt would play any role, and experts would be indifferent
about how much capital to hold, as long as it was properly priced. With moral hazard, instead,
they have a well defined demand for capital, proportional to their net worth.
It is useful to obtain an expression for a "fictitious" price of idiosyncratic risk28
Ctt vt
Xt
Under this formulation, each expert faces a complete financial market without the equity constraint,
28 See Cox and Huang (1989).
24
and where his own idiosyncratic risk W pays a premium at. Capital is priced as an asset with
exposure #vt to this idiosyncratic risk, and can be abstracted from2 9 . We can verify that the expert
will chose an exposure to his own idiosyncratic risk &,,t = "1 = #y vt as required in equilibrium. In
-y X
this sense the fictitious price of idiosyncratic risk at is "right". An advantage of the fictitious market
formulation is that the only difference between experts' and consumers' problem is that experts
perceive a positive price for idiosyncratic risk at > 0, while consumers perceive a price of zero.
Aggregate risk sharing. Optimal contracts allow experts to share aggregate risk using the free
process Ot. The optimal contract effectively separates the decision of how much capital to hold from
the decision of how much aggregate risk to hold. The FOC for aggregate risk sharing for experts
are:
U - 7o - t (1.12)
myopic hedging motive
Experts' optimal aggregate risk exposure depend on a myopic risk-taking given by the price of risk3 0
and the risk-aversion parameter, E, and a hedging motive driven by the stochastic investment
possibility sets, 2- lot. This hedging motive is standard in Intertemporal CAPM models, going
back to Merton (1973), and it will play a crucial role in the amplification and propagation of
aggregate shocks through experts' balance sheets. Recall the "net worth multiplier" (t captures the
stochastic general equilibrium conditions the expert faces
Vt (n)=
1 - -
If the expert is risk neutral, he will prefer to have more net worth when (t is high, since he can
obtain a lot of long-term utility out of each unit of net worth. This is a "substitution effect", and
works against the balance sheet channel, since (t is relatively higher during downturns. On the
other hand, when dt is low he requires more net worth to achieve any given level of utility. If the
expert is risk averse, he will prefer to have more net worth when (t is low. This is a "wealth effect",
and will underlie the balance sheet amplification channel for uncertainty shocks, inducing experts
29 We can use (1.11) to rewrite experts' dynamic budget constraint
= (rt + wton,t + atont) dt + on,tdZt + an,tdWit
where the expert can freely choose an,t and ont. Experts problem then is to maximize their objective function,
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint
1E [j ineuduJ = no
where the fictitious SPD # follows: dt = -rtdt - 7idZt - atdWi,t for expert i.
sort is a column vector and must be transposed, hence r't.
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to take aggregate risk. Which effect dominates depends on the risk aversion parameter3 1 . When
-y < 1, equation (1.12) tells us the expert wants his net worth to be positively correlated with t:
the substitution effect dominates. When - > 1, instead, the wealth effect dominates. I focus on the
case where the wealth effect dominates, / > 1.
Consumers have analogous FOC conditions for aggregate risk sharing
I
omwt= 7 ct _ (1.13)
myopic hedging motive
where the only difference is that consumers' investment possibility sets are captured by (t instead
of (t. Since consumers cannot buy capital, its price and idiosyncratic risk-premium does not affect
them, but they still face a stochastic investment possibility set from interest rates rt and price of
aggregate risk irt.
The volatility of balance sheets ax,t arises from the interaction of experts' and consumers' risk-
taking decisions. Using the equilibrium condition o,1x + a, (1 - x) = (o + op) we obtain the fol-
lowing expression for the exposure of experts' balance sheets to aggregate risk:
ex,t (1 - Xt)Xt (ac,t - ogt) (1.14)
relative
hedging motive
Since experts and consumers cannot both hedge in the same direction in equilibrium, it is the
difference in their hedging motives which will cause experts balance sheets to be overexposed to
aggregate risk. The term (oC,t - ou,t) captures experts' and consumers' relative hedging motives.
The terms (1 - xt) and x arise because experts are able to hedge their investment possibility sets
only to the extent that consumers as a whole are willing to take the other side of the hedge. When
xt is close to 1, the typical expert is dealing mostly with other experts in the financial market. On
the other hand, when xt is close to 0, even if experts want to take a very large risky position, they
have very little net worth and are not able to affect the distribution of aggregate wealth very much.
The 7-! term captures the "substitution" and "wealth" effects.
Experts' and consumers' investment possibility sets depend on balance sheets xt, and so are
endogenously determined in equilibrium in a two way feedback: experts balance sheets are exposed
to aggregate risk to hedge stochastic investment possibility sets, but the volatility of investment
possibility sets actually depends on the exposure of experts' balance sheets to aggregate risk. We
can use the Markov equilibrium characterization and Ito's lemma to obtain a simple expression for
3 1EZ preferences separate risk aversion -y from the EIS Vi-1.
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the relative hedging motive
o-c ~ ~ft -ot= JVV-t + - G 0Xt (.5
exogenous endogenous
where the functions are evaluated at (vl, xt). The locally linear representation allows a neat decom-
position into an exogenous source of relative hedging motive, driven by the uncertainty shock to vt,
and an endogenous source from optimal contracts' aggregate risk sharing ax,t. We can solve for the
fixed point of this two-way feedback:
(xt)xt"
a2,t =tx-- V'ikov (1.16)
Only uncertainty shocks will create a balance sheet channel. This suggests that in the benchmark
case with only Brownian TFP shocks there won't be a balance sheet channel. Notice that even
though the presence of moral hazard does not directly restrict experts' ability to share aggregate
risk, it introduces hedging motives through the general equilibrium which would not be present
without moral hazard, as shown by Proposition 6.
1.3.2 Brownian TFP benchmark
When aggregate shocks come only in the form of Brownian TFP shocks to capital and we allow
agents to write contracts on all observable variables, there is no balance sheet channel. After a
negative TFP shock, the value of all assets ptkt falls and everyone, experts and consumers alike,
looses net worth proportionally, so o-,t = 0. Experts then have lower net worth, but the value
of capitai they must hold in equilibrium is also lower, so the idiosyncratic risk they must carry is
constant as a proportion of their net worth. Investment possibility sets then are not affected by
aggregate shocks, and consequently there is no relative hedging motive, -C,t - Ut = 0. Balance
sheets xt may still affect the economy, due to the presence of financial frictions derived from the
moral hazard problem, but they won't be exposed to aggregate risk and hence won't play any role
in the amplification of aggregate TFP shocks. In fact, the equilibrium is completely deterministic,
up to the direct effect of TFP shocks on the aggregate capital stock.
Proposition 9. With only Brownian TFP shocks , i.e. o-, = 0, if agents can write contracts on
the aggregate state of the economy, the balance sheet channel disappears: the state variable xt, the
price of capital pt, the growth rate of the economy gt, the interest rate rt, and the price of risk lrt
all follow deterministic paths and are not affected by aggregate shocks.
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Balance sheet
The negative result of Proposition 9 has two ingredients: 1) optimal contracts separate the
decision of how much capital to buy (leverage) from the decision of how much aggregate risk to
hold (risk sharing). Risk sharing between experts and consumers will depend only on their relative
hedging motives. The difference in hedging motives is ultimately traced to the fact that experts can
trade and use capital. This gives us expression (1.14):
ax,t (1 - Xt)Xt (aC,t - Ja,t)
And 2) aggregate Brownian TFP shocks don't affect investment possibility sets directly and so don't
create a relative hedging motive by themselves. The exogenous source of relative hedging motive
disappears, so we are left with only the endogenous component in expression (1.15):
exogenous = 0 endogenous
With no exogenous source, however, the unique Markov equilibrium has deterministic investment
possibility sets, no relative hedging motive, and hence no overexposure to aggregate risk which
could endogenously affect investment possibility sets. The continuous-time setting provides a locally
linear relationship which guarantees this is the unique Markov equilibrium, given by equation (1.16).
Without any source of aggregate volatility, the economy then follows a deterministic path.
Implementation. When contracts can be written on all aggregate observable shocks, leverage
and risk sharing are two independent decisions. How realistic are these contracts? Proposition 4
shows the optimal contract can be implemented with simple financial instruments: an expert buys
capital ptkt and sells a fraction 1 - # of his equity. He then buys a market index, or shorts it, to
obtain the right exposure to aggregate risk. Even though the ability to short the market index is
important for deriving Proposition 9 in general, experts might typically be going long on market
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indices. We can compute their investment in the normalized market index Ot explicitly:
Ot =(o+ap,t) Xt- + =xt _ a
Xt Xt Xt
> 0 =0 _0
Their portfolio position on the market indices will be positive or negative depending on whether
xt > #. Without any relative hedging motives (Oat = oc,t = 0), experts and consumers will hold a
fraction of aggregate wealth proportional to their net worth or wealth, respectively: an,t = ow,t =
a + 0 p,t = a. Experts are required to hold a fraction # of their equity, which already exposes them
to a fraction # of aggregate risk. If their net worth represents more than fraction # of aggregate
wealth xt > #, they will want to further buy more aggregate risk by going long on a market index,
or their competitors equity. On the other hand, if xt < #, they will short the market index to get
rid of some of the aggregate risk contained in their equity.
Constrained Contracts. The economy may be hit by a large number of orthogonal aggregate
shocks, i.e. d > 1. The negative result in Proposition 9 doesn't require complete markets, only that
leverage and risk sharing be separated. In terms of implementation in a financial market, we need the
financial market to span the exposure to aggregate risk of the return to capital odZ. In this case, an
expert can buy capital and immediately get rid of the aggregate risk using financial instruments. He
can then share aggregate risk with consumers using any available financial instruments. Without
any endogenous hedging motives both experts and consumers will choose the same exposure to
aggregate risk and eliminate the balance sheet channel.
Proposition 10. Even if the financial market spans only a linear combination of aggregate shocks
Zt = BZt, for a matrix B with full rank d' < d, then as long as the exposure of capital to aggregate
risk o is in the row space of B, the result of Proposition 9 holds.
If experts can short the equity of their competitors, who have a similar exposure to aggregate
risk as they do, they can get rid of the aggregate risk in their capital. In a competitive market,
there is a large number of competitors so their idiosyncratic risks can be aggregated away. In other
words, an index made up competitors' equity is exactly the instrument required to separate leverage
from risk sharing and obtain the negative result.
Corollary 11. As long as a market index of experts' equity can be traded, the balance sheet channel
disappears.
In contrast to Proposition 9, when we rule out contracts on aggregate shocks, i.e. B 0, experts'
leverage and aggregate risk sharing become entangled. In the simplest case with # 1 as in the
baseline setting in BS, if experts are leveraged ptkt > nt, then when a negative aggregate shock
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reduces the value of capital experts will lose net worth more than proportionally:
O0X,t _-Xt (On - 0 - Oap,t) =Xt (t - i) (a + Orot) > 0
>0
This reduces their ability to hold capital and lowers asset prices, further hurting their balance sheets,
and amplifying and propagating the initial shock. This is precisely the mechanism behind the
balance sheet channel in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2011).12
1.3.3 Solving the model with uncertainty shocks
The negative results in Propositions 9 and 10, and especially Corollary 11 should be interpreted as a
TFP-neutrality benchmark. Allowing agents to write contracts contingent on the aggregate state of
the economy creates a theoretical puzzle: what explains the disproportionate aggregate risk taking
that drives financial crises? The literature has typically imposed constraints on the contract space
that limit agents ability to share aggregate risk, or explored different contractual environments that
micro-found these constraints. Here, however, I propose a different approach and look at the kind
of structural shocks hitting the economy. When contracts cannot be written on the aggregate state
of the economy, the type of aggregate shock hitting the economy is not relevant for the purposes
of the balance sheet channel. As long as the aggregate shock depresses asset values and experts
are leveraged, their balance sheets will be disproportionately affected and create a balance sheet
recession. When we allow agents to write contracts on the aggregate state of the economy, on the
other hand, the type of aggregate shock that hits the economy takes on a prominent role.
Uncertainty shocks will have a direct effect on the the price of capital and the growth rate of
the economy, due to the presence of financial frictions. When Vt is high, experts demand a high
idiosyncratic risk premium on capital. In contrast to Brownian TFP shocks, uncertainty shocks are
also amplified through a balance sheet channel. Uncertainty shocks affect experts' balance sheets
disproportionally, even though they are able to freely share aggregate risk. Experts therefore become
less willing to hold capital, driving down its price and amplifying the effects of the uncertainty shock.
This balance sheet channel is the result of an endogenous hedging motive which I will explain in
detail below.
The strategy to solve for the equilibrium with uncertainty shocks is to first use optimality and
market clearing conditions to obtain expressions for equilibrium objects in terms of the stochastic
processes for p, , and (, and then use Ito's lemma to map the problem into a system of partial
differential equations for the price of capital p (v, x) and the multipliers ( (v, x) and ( (v, x). The
pricing equation for capital (1.11), experts' HJB (1.9) and market clearing for consumption goods
3 2 In He and Krishnamurthy (2011) a similar mechanism underlies the volatility of experts' net worth (specialists
in their model), but the price of capital falls because consumers are more impatient and interest rates must rise for
consumption-goods markets to clear.
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Figure 1-1: The price of capital p and the growth rate g, as functions of v (left) for x =
(dotted), and x = 0.75 (dashed), and as a function of x (right) for v = 0.25 (solid), yv
v = 0.75 (dashed). For parameter values see Numerical Solution below.
0.25 (solid), x = 0.5
= 0.5 (dotted), and
provide three functional equations3 3 . Because neither experts nor consumers want to ever hit their
solvency constraint and have zero wealth3 , we look for an equilibrium with x E (0, 1). In the
interest of simplicity, I consider a one dimensional exogenous Brownian shock, i.e. d = 1. This
shock will affect both capital directly through o- > 0 and the volatility of idiosyncratic risk vt
through orvt < 0.35 I show the procedure for solving the equilibrium in detail in Appendix C.
Balance sheet channel. Figure 1-1 shows the price of capital and the growth rate of the economy
as functions of v and x. Both higher idiosyncratic risk v, and weaker balance sheets x increase the
idiosyncratic risk premium on capital and reduce its price. This, in turn, depresses the growth rate
of the economy g through the static FOC for investment
L' (g) - p
33Two second order partial differential equations and an algebraic constraint.
3 4 With intertemporally linear preferences, 1P = 0, agents might actually accept to reach their solvency constraint.
I show how to deal with this case in section 1.5
3 5 Additional TFP shocks will only have a direct impact on the level of the effective capital stock, but will have no
further effects on the economy.
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An uncertainty shock has a direct effect on the price of capital because its idiosyncratic risk premium
must rise,
gt+pp,t+ao/t+ -rt (a+ap,t)irt + -- ($vt)2T
Pt Xt
excess return agg. risk premium id. risk premium
In addition, the effects of the uncertainty shock are amplified through a balance sheet channel.
Uncertainty shocks create an endogenous hedging motive that induces experts to take aggregate
risk, so x falls when an uncertainty shock hits the economy: ox > 0, as figure 1-2 shows. The
intuition is the following. Downturns are periods of high idiosyncratic risk vt. Since experts cannot
offload all of the idiosyncratic risk in their capital due to the moral hazard problem, in equilibrium
they perceive a high fictitious price for their own idiosyncratic risk W:
at = y > 0 (1.17)Xt
Since in equilibrium they go long on idiosyncratic risk &.,,t = vt > 0, experts benefit from an7y Xt
increase in at. Consequently, conditional on their net worth, they are better off during downturns,
relative to consumers for whom expert-idiosyncratic risk is not priced, i.e.: - < 0. Figure
1-2 shows log (() - log (() is a decreasing function of v. The derivative with respect to v of the log
difference is precisely -
This creates a relative hedging motive between experts and consumers
<0 <0
exogenous > 0
(recall this relative hedging motive drives the volatility of balance sheets, according to equation
(1.14) ox,t = (1 - xt)xt1-' (oC,t - og,t)). If agents are risk neutral, the "substitution effect" dom-
inates, and this relative hedging motive induces experts to insure against aggregate risk, in order
to have more net worth during downturns, when each dollar of net worth gets them more utility
relative to consumers. On the other hand, if agents are risk averse, with 7 > 1, the "wealth effect"
dominates. During economic booms, when idiosyncratic risk vt and its price at are low, experts need
more net worth to obtain any given level of utility, relative to consumers, so the relative hedging
motive induces experts to take aggregate risk and have more net worth during economic booms.
This hedging motive drives the balance sheet channel if y > 1:
x,t (1 - Xt)Xt (Oc,t - og,t) > 0 (1.18)
>0 >0
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Figure 1-2: The volatility of balance sheets o and log (() - log ( ) as functions of v (left) x = 0.25 (solid),
x = 0.5 (dotted), and x = 0.75 (dashed), and as a function of x (right) for v = 0.25 (solid), v = 0.5 (dotted),
and v = 0.75 (dashed). For parameter values see Numerical Solution below.
When an uncertainty shock hits the economy and idiosyncratic risk rises, experts' balance sheets
are disproportionately3 6 hit, so their share of aggregate wealth xt falls (a2,t > 0). With weak balance
sheets (low xt), holding all the effective capital stock in the economy requires experts to leverage
up and accept a large amount of idiosyncratic risk, so the fictitious price of idiosyncratic risk must
go up:
at vt 1
Xt
Conditional on net worth, experts are better off (relative to consumers) when balance sheets are
weak, i.e. Lx - x > 0. Figure 1-2 shows log (() - log (() is an increasing function of x. Thus weak
balance sheets endogenously feed back to amplify the relative hedging motive:
<0 <0
exogenous > 0
>0 >0
(n dogenous>0
endogenous > 0
which in turn amplifies experts' aggregate risk taking according to equation (1.18). Equilibrium is
seRecall in equilibrium experts exposure to aggregate risk is o -,t = 0 + op,t + > U + ap,t.
Xt
>0
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Figure 1-2 also shows the volatility of balance sheets, o,. It's positive throughout and larger
during periods of high idiosyncratic risk v. This means uncertainty shocks that increase idiosyn-
cratic risk v in the economy hit experts' balance sheets disproportionately and reduce the share of
aggregate wealth that belongs to experts x. This will create a balance sheet recession. Seen as a
function of balance sheets x, their volatility u has an inverted U-shape. It's larger in the interior of
the domain, and vanishes as it approaches the boundaries. This behavior is due to the term (1 -x)x
in formula (1.14). When x is close to either boundary, one type of agent has almost dropped from
the economy, so the relative hedging between experts and consumers that underlies the volatility of
balance sheets vanishes.
Aggregate risk and flight to safety. After an uncertainty shock exogenously raises idiosyncratic
risk vt in the economy, the economy experiences also endogenously high aggregate risk o + p,t and a
flight to safety event with low interest rates rt and high risk premia lrt. Figure 1-3 shows aggregate
risk rising when idiosyncratic risk vt is high and balance sheets xt are weak. The demand for
aggregate risk from agents for hedging purposes also falls during downturns
7rt 1 - Y
- + (otxt + Ot(1 - xt)) = 0- + 0p
myopic t hedging 4 supply T
This combination of reduced appetite for aggregate risk just when assets become more risky drives
the price of aggregate risk lrt up and create a flight to the safety of risk free bonds that depresses
the interest rate rt. In fact, uncertainty shocks may drive the risk-free interest rate below zero. In
a richer model with sticky prices this could lead to a "liquidity trap".
34
o-+o-P X
0.09 1-0- --
0.08 0.8-
0.0 o 0 .1 0,2 0. 0.4'-0.15 0.6 0.7
0.07 0.6 -0.30
0.06 0.4
0.04 
-0.20
01 0.203 0.4 0.5 0.6 07 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 02
0.10 1.
0 2 .4 . . 1. 0 0.2 00.6 0.8 1.00.9
0.08 0.8
0.07 - 0.7 .- 0.3
0,06 0.6 -0A
0.5 -0 5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 -0.
Figure 1-3: Aggregate risk o + cp, the price of risk 7r, and risk free interest rate r as functions of v (above)
x = 0.25 (solid), x = 0.5 (dotted), and x = 0.75 (dashed), and as a function of x (below) for v = 0.25 (solid),
v = 0.5 (dotted), and v = 0.75 (dashed). For parameter values see Numerical Solution below.
Stochastic risk premia have been extensively studied in the asset pricing literature. Campbell
and Cochrane (1999), for example, introduce habit and obtain stochastic risk-premia. Here, instead,
risk premia respond to aggregate shocks due to the presence of financial frictions. In the benchmark
without moral hazard, risk premia are constant. He and Krishnamurthy (2011) obtain stochastic
risk premia in a similar model where balance sheets play an important role. In their model, agents
cannot write contracts on the aggregate state of the economy, so risk premia must induce experts
to take aggregate risk. Here instead, agents can share aggregate risk freely, since optimal contracts
separate leverage from aggregate risk sharing.
Implementation Recall that optimal contracts can be implemented using standard financial
instruments such as equity and a market index. The expert must keep a fraction # of his own equity
and this forces him to keep a fraction # of his idiosyncratic risk, but he can adjust his exposure
to aggregate risk using a market index. Recall also that Ot can be interpreted as his portfolio
investment in a market index normalized with identity loading on the aggregate risk
0t = (a- + o-y,t ) Xt- + OX
Xt Xt
myopic risk-sharing hedging
The first term corresponds to the myopic risk sharing motive. Since aggregate risk pays a
premium, both experts and consumers want to buy some of it. They face the same price of risk
irt, so they have the same myopic incentives and they should share aggregate risk proportionally
to their wealth. Experts must keep a fraction # of their equity, which already exposes them to a
fraction # of aggregate risk. The first use of the market index is to adjust experts' exposure to
aggregate risk to achieve proportional risk sharing. The second term captures the hedging motive
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y = 0.75 (dashed). For parameter values see Numerical Solution below.
O > 0. Experts want to increase their exposure to aggregate risk in order to take advantage of
stochastic investment possibility sets. When the economy is hit only by a Brownian TFP shock,
the hedging motive disappears and we are left with only the first term.
The most striking feature of Figure 1-4 is that 0 is positive for most values of (v, x). Not only
are experts not getting insurance against aggregate risk, they are using the financial instruments at
their disposal to buy even more aggregate risk than what the equity constraint forces them to.
Long-run dynamics. The volatility a vanishes near the boundaries, so x never reaches them. In
the short-run, an uncertainty shock that increases idiosyncratic risk weakens balance sheets because
experts are overexposed to it, a- > 0. In the medium-run, however, higher idiosyncratic risk leads
to stronger balance sheets, as experts obtain greater profits and postpone consumption, relative to
consumers. Figure 1-5 shows the drift of balance sheets p, is increasing in v and decreasing in x. In
the long-run idiosyncratic risk goes back to its long-run mean, and so do balance sheets. Figure 1-5
also shows the drift of balance sheets yt is positive and diverging to oo when x -+ 0, and becomes
negative as x -+ 1. We can verify that boundaries are never reached, and the equilibrium has a
non-degenerate stationary distribution with a long-run steady state. This can be computed using
the forward Kolmogorov equation.
Numerical solution. I use the following parameter values. Preferences: The discount rate is
p = 0.05, the risk aversion is y = 5, while the EIS37 is set at 1.5 (i.e.: 0 = 0.66). Experts retire
with Poisson arrival rate r = 0.4. Technology: capital productivity is normalized to a = 1. Capital
exposure to aggregate risk is o = 0.03 in line with the observed volatility of output. Moral Hazard:
Hedge funds typically keep 20% of returns above a threshold, so I set # = 0.2. The investment
function takes the simple form t (g) = 200g 2 , so g (p) = P and t (p) = -, so that the growth rate
37Campbell and Beeler (2009) uses an EIS of 1.5. Gruber (2006) estimates an EIS of 2 based on variation across
individuals in the capital income tax rate.
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near the stead state is reasonable. Idiosyncratic volatility is set with a long-run mean of C = 0.24,
mean reversion parameter A = 0.22, and a loading on the aggregate shock a, = -0.13. I use data
on idiosyncratic volatility from Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), and fit the monthly
idiosyncratic standard deviation to a discretized version of (1.2):
ut+1 - ut = A (0 - lt) + aotet+1
where the error terms ct are i.i.d. I then obtain the OLS estimators for the parameters A, 0, and
ov.
1.3.4 Financial shocks
The economy I study above is driven by the exogenous process for the volatility of idiosyncratic
risk vt. A fraction 1 - # of idiosyncratic risk is shared and aggregated away, as if the volatility
of idiosyncratic risk was actually #vt. We may then take #vt as the exogenous state variable.
Intuitively, it makes no difference to experts whether they must keep a fixed fraction # of more
idiosyncratic risk v' > v, or they must hold a larger fraction #' > # of the same underlying amount
of idiosyncratic risk v. A mathematically equivalent setup for the model takes y fixed and lets the
parameter #t follow a stochastic process3. The only variable affected is Ot, experts' portfolio share
in the market index. Otherwise, the equilibrium is characterized by the same set of equations.
Proposition 12. Aggregate shocks to idiosyncratic risk v are equivalent to aggregate shocks to the
moral hazard parameter #, up to implementation.
3 8 He and Krishnamurthy (2011)consider a stochastic moral hazard setting in the model. Because they restrict
agents' ability to share aggregate risk and assume log preferences, the stochastic moral hazard does not change
agents' choices nor does it create a balance sheet channel (which already exists in their model due to the contracting
constraints they assume).
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Since moral hazard micro-founds the financial friction in the model, this stochastic moral hazard
specification has the interpretation of aggregate shocks to financial frictions, or financial shocks, since
they induce experts to try to deleverage (although in equilibrium they can't). In general, both #
and v may be stochastic and help drive balance sheet recessions. Although the economic phenomena
behind shocks to # or v might be very different, it's possible to imagine a single structural shock,
such as a deep loss of trust in the financial system, that both increases idiosyncratic risk v and
tightens financial frictions #. Eggertsson and Krugman (2010), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) and
Buera and Moll (2012) also consider exogenous shocks to the financial friction in their models.
Although exogenous shocks to financial conditions, as captured by #t, are equivalent from a
mathematical point of view to uncertainty shocks which increase the volatility of idiosyncratic risk
in the economy, it is natural to assume they follow different stochastic processes. Here I explore an
alternative specification of the model, where idiosyncratic volatility is constant, i.e.: vt = v, and
the parameter for moral hazard follows an exogenous stochastic process
dot - o-dZt
Since #t E 10, 11 is a constraint, I set up two reflective boundaries, at # 0 and # 1, which impose
the following boundary conditions on the system of partial differential equations:
pO (0, X) = pO (1, X) =_ (4 (0, x) =_ (4 (1, X) = 0
As we approach # -+ 0 or # -+ 1, the system becomes less sensitive to financial conditions #. The
intuition is as follows. A higher # directly constraints experts' idiosyncratic risk sharing and hence
reduces their demand for capital. In addition, because shocks to # are persistent, it affects agents'
expectations about the future path of #t (and, endogenously, of x). As we approach # -+ 1, however,
this second, indirect effect vanishes. Agents know that financial conditions cannot get worse, so
their expectations about the future path of # are less sensitive to further increases in #. At the
other boundary, #= 0 there is an analogous situation.
In addition, in order to show how the model is solved when the x = 1 boundary can be reached,
I use intertemporally linear preferences V) = 0, and I remove turnover r = 0. Now x = 1 is an
absorbing state and is reached in finite time. When this happens consumers drop out and we have
simple economy with identical agents, and therefore no balance sheet effects. I show how to solve
this model in Appendix D, including how to handle the new boundary condition at x = 1.
As Figure 1-6 shows, the main results don't change. The price of capital falls when financial
conditions worsen, and experts' overexposure to this source of aggregate risk, or. > 0, creates a
balance sheet channel and amplify the effects of the shock. On the other hand, the balance sheet
channel disappears near the boundaries # 0 and # 1, as shocks to # have a vanishing effect on
agents' value functions and hedging motives. This impacts the behavior of total volatility o + orp,
risk-free interest rates r and the price of aggregate "financial" risk 7r.
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Figure 1-6: IStochastic moral hazard] The price of capital p and the volatility of balance sheets ax, as
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for 4 = 0.25 (solid), 4 0.5 (dotted), and 4 - 0.75 (dashed). For parameter values see Numerical Solution
below.
Numerical solution. I use the same parameter values as before, except V) = 0, the idiosyncratic
volatility v = 0.2 and moral hazard follows an arithmetic Brownian motion dot = -0.13dZt.
1.4 Optimal policy
The model has several lessons for optimal policy. In standard models of balance sheet recessions
driven by TFP shocks, where contracts cannot be written on the aggregate state of the economy,
providing aggregate insurance to experts is a Pareto improving policy. For example, by promising
to "bail out" experts, the government is implicitly forcing consumers to share aggregate risk with
them, and this can help avoid balance sheet recessions. BS, for example, show how a social planner
can achieve first best allocations if he has enough controls over the economy.
In contrast, when we allow agents to write contracts on the aggregate state of the economy, two
new issues arise. First, experts may react to the policy intervention by taking more risk. They were
sharing aggregate risk optimally from an individual point of view, so if government policy changes
their underlying exposure to aggregate risk, they will simply try to undo its effects by taking more
risk in order to achieve the same target exposure to aggregate risk. This is a separate issue from
moral hazard and "too big to fail", since experts incentives are not changing. They have the same
target exposure to aggregate risk and are forced to achieve it through other means if the government
provides them with some insurance.
Second, understanding agents' incentives for taking aggregate risk is important not only on
theoretical grounds, but also for the design of financial regulation. Once we introduce uncertainty
3 9Even if agents are unable to share aggregate risk on their own, they might increase their consumption and
dynamically weaken their balance sheets. This can lead to a "volatility paradox", as in BS.
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shocks and obtain a balance sheet channel, we also realize that experts may actually have good
reasons to be taking so much aggregate risk. It's not clear anymore that eliminating the balance
sheet channel is optimal. The following policy experiment illustrates this point.
Financial regulation. Consider the following reasonable policy intervention: the government
regulates experts' aggregate risk sharing, forcing them to take aggregate risk proportionally to their
net worth
O'n,t =O* + U'p,t
OI' - 0
so the balance sheet channel disappears. This can be achieved by forcing experts to short a market
index to offset the aggregate risk contained in their capital:
t =(or + at) Xt
The government also carries out a one time wealth transfer between experts and consumers in
order to keep consumers indifferent. Normalize the capital stock to ko = 1, and let Ureg (V, x) =
be the present value of utility for consumers under this policy of financial regulation,
and Ueq (V, x) their value in the unregulated equilibrium. Likewise, Vreg (v, x) and Veq (v, x) are the
corresponding value functions for experts. Then the government changes the distribution of wealth
from xo to x1 such that:
Ureg (v, x 1) - U*q (v, Xo)
We can then look at the utility of experts after the policy intervention: Vr'9 (v, xi) - V e (v, Xo).
Figure 1-7 captures the results for Xo = -. The policy is Pareto improving if enacted during periods
of low idiosyncratic risk, but becomes counterproductive when v is high. This allows us to draw two
conclusions: 1) the competitive equilibrium is not efficient and can be improved upon by financial
regulation, and 2) the naive policy of eliminating the balance sheet channel is not optimal.
Subsidies to capital. Another policy often proposed is for the government to intervene in asset
markets in order to prop up their value. Imagine the government institutes a subsidy on capital b.
This changes the expected return of capital to
|kl ,a+b-tt
Et dRk =pp,t ± gt + a,t' +
The government then taxes experts on their wealth, so that in equilibrium there is no wealth transfer.
Consumers are left altogether out of the scheme. This policy will increase the price of capital. As
before, the government can carry out a one time transfer between experts and consumers in order
to leave consumers indifferent U""a (v, x1) = U*q (v, xo), and we can look at experts' value functions
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Figure 1-7: The difference in experts' utility after the policy intervention Vreg (v, x 1) - V4 (v, X0),
for o = , as a function of v.
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Figure 1-8: The difference in experts' utility Vso (V, x1) - Veq
, after a subsidy b = 0.1 to capital is introduced,.
1(v, xo), as a function of v for Xo
VIb (v, X1 ) - V'q (v, X0 ). Figure 1-8 shows a subsidy to capital of b = 0.1 increases experts' welfare.
To some extent, the low price of capital was depressing investment and growth. But even with
an exogenous growth rate g, increasing the value of capital improves idiosyncratic risk sharing in
equilibrium. With higher price for capital, if consumers wealth is kept constant, experts will own a
higher fraction of aggregate wealth, and this will allow them to reduce their leverage, and hence their
exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Of course, since growth depends on the price of capital, subsidies
that are too high could be inefficient.
1.5 Extensions and variants
Long-term contracts. In the contractual environment introduced in Section 1.2, experts' lack
commitment to long-term contracts. Since their private benefit from stealing is purely pecuniary, if
they could commit to long-term contracts that control their consumption, the first best contract will
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full insurance against idiosyncratic risk could be achieved. Intuitively, the expert can divert funds
to a private hidden account, but can't really do anything useful with those funds. The only way
stealing can affect the experts' objective function is by changing the continuation of his consumption
stream c. But in the optimal contract without moral hazard the expert is completely insured from
the observable outcome R which is the only thing he affects by stealing. Consequently, stealing has
no effects on the expert's utility and the optimal contract without moral hazard is also the optimal
contract in this case.
Proposition 13. The optimal contract without moral hazard is also the optimal contract with moral
hazard if experts can commit to long-term contracts.
Corollary. The First Best equilibrium from Proposition 6 is also the equilibrium when experts have
full commitment to long-term contracts.
One way to make the moral hazard problem binding is to make consumption not contractible.
This is the approach taken in Myerson (2012) or DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). Here, instead, I
take the same approach as in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2011)
and introduce re-contracting. This yields a tractable "equity constraint" formulation for the optimal
contract and allows for a straightforward comparison with those papers. Alternatively, we could
explore a setting where the private action yields a private benefit in utility terms, such as Sannikov
(2008). This creates a moral hazard problem even with commitment to long-term contracts.
Generalized moral hazard. In the contracting environment developed in Section 1.2 the
agent's private action does not interact with aggregate shocks, so aggregate risk sharing does not
enter into the IC constraint. This is a standard result in the contracts literature, and leads to the
separation of experts' leverage and aggregate risk sharing which underlies the negative result of
Proposition 9.
An alternative to introducing ad-hoc constraints on the contract space is to explore different
contractual environments that may limit experts' ability to share aggregate risk. In Di Tella (2012)
I introduce pecuniary moral hazard in a more general way into a similar model with only Brownian
TFP shocks. I find that moral hazard will distort aggregate risk sharing for incentive-provision
reasons when the private action affects the exposure to aggregate risk of the private pecuniary
benefit.
Consider a CEO who must choose a supplier for his firm. He can choose an inefficient supplier
on which he has previously secretly invested. This has a negative impact on the firm's profits, but
he benefits through his secret investment in the supplier. Obtaining this private benefit, however,
required him to expose his net worth to the aggregate risk to which the supplier is exposed.
= (rt + <ptktst + 1rton,t) dt + (n,t - Atptkt (or + op,t) + 3ptktst) dZt + Atptkt (dR - E [dR)nt
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Here At is the exposure of the agent's net worth to the return of his firm (equity), # is the private
benefit he obtain per dollar diverted, and # the impact of diversion on the exposure to aggregate
risk of his private benefit. The optimal contract will then overexpose the agent to aggregate risk,
to deter him from taking the private action that further increases his exposure. The local incentive
compatibility constraint becomes:
At # -o,t#
The more exposed to aggregate risk the agent is (higher a-2,t) the less exposed to his firm's return
he must be in order to implement any given st, and hence less exposed to idiosyncratic risk. The
optimal contract takes advantage of this tradeoff between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk sharing.
The resulting overexposure to aggregate risk will create a balance sheet channel.
The optimal contract in this case can also be implemented using equity and market indices,
but the informational requirements are bigger. The principal must be able to monitor the agent's
financial portfolio, not only the trading of his firm's equity. Otherwise, the agent would be able to
secretly undo the incentive scheme.
This result suggests that if the agent's private action affects the exposure to aggregate risk of the
firm's returns, the same tradeoff between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk sharing would arise. This
is not the case, however, because non-linear contracts can provide better incentives. In continuous-
time, the volatility of a stochastic process is observable, so the contract is able to severely punish the
CEO if he takes an action that creates an unexpected aggregate volatility of observable returns.4 0
This is just an extreme case of a more general principle. In a discrete-time approximation, by using
non-linear contracts that make the agent's net worth a concave function of the firm's return, the
principal can induce an aversion to aggregate risk on the agent without need to overexpose him
to it in equilibrium. The continuous-time contract can be understood as an extremely non-linear
response to out of equilibrium behavior.
Elasticity of intertenporal substitution. The consumption goods market can play an impor-
tant role. While aggregate risk sharing, and hence the balance sheet channel, depends on agents'
relative risk aversion y, the impact of higher idiosyncratic risk or weaker balance sheets on the price
of capital depends on the EIS 0~1. I solve the model for empirically reasonable EIS >1 (V < 1).
A special case arises if we let @ = 1. This corresponds to preferences that are intertemporally log.
Agents will consume a constant fraction p of their wealth. Market clearing for consumption goods
then pins down the price of capital
a -t
p
Neither idiosyncratic risk vt, nor experts' balance sheets xt will affect the price of capital. This
doesn't mean balance sheets xt are not important, and there will still be a balance sheet channel in
40Technically, the private action does not induce an absolutely continuous change in the probability distribution
of the observable firm's return Rk, so Girsanov's theorem doesn't apply.
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the economy, a. > 0. But it will affect other aggregate prices, such as the risk-free interest rate rt
and the price of aggregate risk 7rt, which must endogenously adjust to keep the price of capital p at
a constant value consistent with equilibrium in the consumption goods market.
This is well a known result that rests on some simplifying assumptions which make the model
more tractable. If consumers were able to use capital less efficiently than experts (instead of not
at all) then the price of capital would not be constant. The market clearing condition in the
consumption goods market would become
P ari + ac(1 - K)-t
where a' < a the output of capital when controlled by consumers and K is the fraction of aggregate
capital controlled by experts, which will generally depend on both Vt and xt.
In contrast, He and Krishnamurthy (2011) keep the simple limited participation setup, and use
log preferences (-y = = 1), but have consumers be more impatient than experts: pC > pe. The
equation for market clearing in the consumption goods market becomes:
p (px+ pc(1 - x)) = a - t
a - t
(pex + pC(1 - x))
When experts lose net worth (x falls), the average discount rate in the market goes up: experts
want to consume more and need to be convinced otherwise by a higher interest rate. This drives
the price of capital down.
The model can be extended to deal with these cases in a straightforward manner. I focus on the
simpler case with limited participation and homogenous preferences with 4 < 1.
Structural Shocks. I have focused on uncertainty shocks to vt (equivalent to financial shocks
to # ) but these are not the only possibilities. The broader lesson from this paper is that the type
of structural shock hitting the economy can play an important role in generating balance sheet
recessions. The same tools developed here can be used to study other structural shocks. Here I
mention some possibilities.
First, aggregate shocks to the long-run growth rate of the economy are a natural place to look.
After financial crises, expectations are often said to have been unduly optimistic before the crash,
and the economy to have been "living beyond its means". This is sometimes interpreted as evidence
for financial bubbles, but it could also be the result of negative aggregate shocks to the growth
rate of the economy, possibly as a result of structural change. The rosy future which was rationally
expected in the past and was driving the high asset values and agents' consumption decisions now
seem unrealistic. Since balance sheet recessions seem to happen after financial crises, it would be
interesting to explore to what extent long-run growth risk can help explain the excessive exposure
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to aggregate risk that drives balance sheet recessions.
Second, demand shocks play a prominent role in business cycle theory. In particular, during
liquidity traps, the central bank is unable to stabilize the economy. The liquidity traps seem to
occur after big financial crises, so it is natural to ask if the two phenomena are related. On the
one hand, the balance sheet channel can help explain how small shocks get amplified and drive the
natural rate of interest into negative territory (as it happens in this model). On the other hand, the
depressed output during liquidity traps exacerbates balance sheet problems, and their particular
properties might help explain why the balance sheets of experts are so exposed to aggregate risk.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper I have shown how uncertainty shocks can help explain the apparently excessive expo-
sure to aggregate risk that drives balance sheet recessions. While we have a good understanding of
why the balance sheets of more productive agents matter in an economy with financial frictions, we
don't have a good explanation for why they are so exposed to aggregate risk. Even if agents face
a moral hazard problem that limits their ability to issue equity, there is nothing preventing them
from sharing aggregate risk, which can we accomplished by trading a simple market index. In fact,
I show that in standard models of balance sheet recessions driven by TFP shocks, the balance sheet
channel completely vanishes when agents are allowed to write contracts contingent on the aggregate
state of the economy.
In contrast to TFP shocks, uncertainty shocks can generate an endogenous relative hedging
motive that induces more productive agents to take on aggregate risk. Uncertainty shocks are
therefore amplified through a balance sheet channel, depressing asset prices and growth, and trig-
gering a "flight to quality" event with low interest rates and high risk premia. I also show that
uncertainty shocks are isomorphic to financial shocks that tighten financial constraints. Finally,
the model has lessons for the design of financial regulation. Most importantly, once we understand
agents' aggregate risk sharing behavior, we realize they might have good reasons to be highly ex-
posed to aggregate risk. I show how a reasonable policy of regulating agents' exposure to aggregate
risk to eliminate the balance sheet channel can be counterproductive.
These results suggest three avenues for future research. The first is to think about optimal
financial regulation more carefully. While completely eliminating the balance sheet channel is not
optimal, neither is the competitive equilibrium. This suggests the question: how much exposure
to aggregate risk is "right"? The second is to consider alternative structural shocks. While I have
focused on uncertainty (and financial) shocks, the same tools developed in this paper can be used
to study other kind of aggregate shocks. For example, shocks to the long-run growth possibilities
of the economy can capture some features of financial crises. Indeed, pre-crisis growth projections
are often judged unduly optimistic with hindsight. This could be the result of negative aggregate
shocks to the growth rate of the economy. Third, liquidity traps seem to happen after big financial
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crisis. During liquidity traps, monetary policy is unable to stabilize the economy, so balance sheet
problems become more severe. Integrating nominal rigidities in models of balance sheet recessions
would allow us to study the interaction of balance sheet recessions and liquidity traps.
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1.7 Appendix A
In this Appendix I develop the contractual environment in more detail. The general equilibrium
prices p and 7 are taken as given throughout, and I suppress the reference i to the expert to simplify
notation. In addition, I repeat part of the setup introduced in Section 1.2 to make this appendix
as self-contained as possible.
Setup. Each expert has an observable bank balance bt, with initial net worth n > 0. He can
continuously trade and use capital. The observable cumulative return from investing a dollar in
capital is Rk - {Rk; t > 0}, with
d k (gtt+L tt -t d(gt)dRt = a+ t ,t + Pt - se)O dt + (o, + op,t ) dZt + vetdWt
Esp dRJ
The expert can divert capital to a private account at a rate s = {st; t > 0} and reduce the observable
return of his investment. He immediately sells it, and obtains # E (0, 1) units of capital per unit
diverted, so his hidden savings4 1 from following a stealing plan s evolve:
dSt = #ptktstdt + Strtdt
where # parametrizes the severity of the moral hazard.
He designs a contract (e, g, k, F) that specifies his consumption et 0, investment gt, capital
kt 0, and a cumulative cash flow Ft he will sell on the financial market, all adapted to the filtration
Wt generated by the observable variables 2 Z and {R} . The cash flow F is an lt-adapted
semimartingale, i.e.: the sum of a finite variation process and a local martingale, which we may
write
dFt = dApFt + aF,tdZt + &Ftd (1.19)
where tFt is a process of finite variation. For now, let (e, g, k, F) be all contractible, as well as b. I
will later relax this assumption. We want to implement st = 0 always, and we can without loss of
generality ignore the observable returns of other experts and focus only on Z and R for expert i.
Under this contract the bank balance of the expert evolves:
dbt = rtbtdt + ptkt (dR - rtdt) - dFt - etdt (1.20)
The expert is interested in maximizing his expected utility Uo, given by (1.3), and the market prices
4 1This specification of hidden savings assumes they are invested at the risk-free interest rate only.
4 2 The general equilibrium processes p and q are also adapted to Wt because they only depend on the aggregate
shocks Z. Also, even though the contract could in principle depend on other experts' returns, it is wlog to write it
only on each expert's own observable return.
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the cash flow F. At time t, the continuation of the contract has present value
Je = E rPoo ' dFu[it Bo,u
where Bo,t = exp (fo rudu) is the value of risk free bond, the expectation is taken under the
equivalent martingale measureQ, and under no stealing, s = O.To make the problem well defined,
we impose a solvency constraint. The expert must have in his bank account enough funds to cover
the continuation value of his contract43 : be - J > 0.
The price of idiosyncratic risk in the financial market is zero, and experts are risk averse, so in
the first best contract without moral hazard, there is full insurance against idiosyncratic risk.
Proposition 14. The first best contract without moral hazard has full insurance against idiosyn-
cratic risk.
As Proposition 13 shows, if agents could commit to long-term contracts that control their con-
sumption, the first best would be implementable. To make the moral hazard problem binding,
I introduce re-contracting as in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy
(2011). This leads to a tractable characterization of optimal contracts and facilitates comparisons
with the literature.
Re-contracting. At any time t, the expert is committed to a single contract. However, he cannot
commit to long term contracts. The expert can at any time settle his obligations and roll-over the
contract. The expert cannot "run away" without paying, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), but he
can offer a new contract (c', g', k', F') with present value Jt' Jt, and the market accepts. Define the
expert's net worth nt = bt - Jt + St: these are the funds he has when rolling over the contract. He
adds his hidden savings to his legitimate bank account bt = bt- + St_ and St = 0, so recontracting
doesn't change his net worth, but allows him to "launder" his hidden savings to use it to optimally
consume, invest, etc. in a new continuation contract. The set of available contracts at time t for
this expert depends on his net worth 44 nt and on aggregate general equilibrium conditions. Let
V (w, t, n) be the value of the best continuation contract the expert can get if he recontracts at (w, t)
with net worth n.
Before moving on, we can characterize the continuation value of the principal Jt as follows:
Lemma 15. For a given feasible contract (e, g, k, F) the continuation value of the principal is a
semimartingale and follows under s = 0:
dJ = djit + ojtdZt + &Jt (dR - Et [dRt (1.21)
4 3 A lower bound for bt - J is required to make the problem well defined.
44because of the solvency constraint bt - Jt > 0.
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dlpj,t = -dpFt + Jtrtdt - (oJt + 'YF,t + (NJt + &Ft) (or + ap,t)) tdt (2
for some finite variation process [tt and progressively-measurable45 {aj,t,&j,t} E M , and the
following transversality condition holds:
Qr [EI100 Bo,t Jullim Et 'J0,
**00t Bo,, .
Proof. The continuation value of the principal is
Jt = Bo,tE
We can work with the following Q-martingale:
Yt I dFu+ J
fBo, u Bo t
Q IdFu
't[o Bo,u , u
and using the martingale representation theorem we get after some manipulation:
dY= 1dFt
Bo,t
+d
(Bo,t = oyQdZ + 1&yt (dRQBo,t 0 tdt Bo,t
for some progressively-measurable oy,t and ay,t in 46 M~where
dZt = dZt + 7rtdt
dRQ - E? [dR1 (dRi - Et [dRk]) + (a + ap,t) irtdt
are Q-brownian motions (dRQ - E? [dR?
arranging we get:
] has exposure (a + ap,t) to Z? and vt to We).
1 dFt
Bo,t
+ 1 oytdZ
Bo,t
which tells us that Jt is a Q-semimartingale, so we can write:
dJt = dfjLt + o-jtdZ + &jt (de - EQ [dRQ]
where jtj± is a finite variation process and progressively measurable O-jt and ait in MQ . Using
"Define M as the set of processes {x, y} for which E [f x dt + f' yT (c + ap,) 2 dt + f" yidt <oo for all T
4 MQ is defined as M but with the expectation taken under Q.
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a.e. (w, t) (1.23)
- E? [dRQ])
d
Bo,t
Re-
1t
+ Bo,t r~
(1-22 )
(dR - E [dR]
t Bo,u
Ito's lemma on - Je we get an expression for d J and matching terms we get the following:
d j ,t _ -d pFt + Jtrtdt + (aFt + &Ft (o + ap,t)) irtdt
Jt= ~ T F,t + JY,t
&Jt -OFPt + UY't
changing the probability back to P we get
dJt -dApFt + Jtrtdt + (oJ,t + TF,t + (&Jt + &Ft) (U + ap,t)) irtdt + ojtdZt + &j,t (dV - Et [dRtk]
For the transversality condition notice that since Y is a Q-martingale
Jo =YO= EQ [Yt = EQ dFu + EQ
L10 Bo,u I Bo,t
and taking the limit t -+ oo we see we need limtoo E[Q Jt =0, and a similar argument shows
this must hold for almost all (w, t) (P and Q are equivalent). l
We have defined the agent's net worth nt bt + St - Jt, so we can use Lemma (15) to compute
the law of motion of nt under no-stealing:
dnt = rtntdt + ptkt (dR- rtdt) - (Ojt + aFt + (&Jt + &F,t) (U, + op,t)) irtdt (1.24)
-( rF,t + UJ,t) dZt - (&F,t + &Jt) (dR - Et= [dR]j - etdt
If the agent steals, we add a drift using Girsanov's theorem and the definition of stealing:
[qpptkt - ptkt + (&Ft + &Jt)I stdt
Stealing yields a flow #ptktstdt to the private account St, and changes the probability distribution
of 4 affecting the drift of bt and Jt. Notice we have superfluous instruments to control n, so we
can without loss of generality set Jt = 0 always and use F,t and UF,t. The transversality condition
limteo E [rktJt] = 0 is then satisfied automatically. We just need to make sure, at the end, that
EQ [ftoo BotdF] 0 for all (w, t). Define &Ft = ptkt (1 - a t -"- and for s Owe gett Bo,U (wt) IFt ~ and O 7'adfrs=0w e
the dynamic budget constraint (1.5) and (1.6). We may then identify the contract (e, g, k, F) with
the corresponding (e, g, k, , 6).
Since the general equilibrium is Markov in the state variables X = (v, x) that follow Ito processes,
we will look for V (w, t, n) = V (X, n), and define it recursively as the viscosity solution to the
following HJB equation:
0 = max f (et, Vt) + E8= [dVt|
(e,g,,t
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where dVt is computed with Ito's lemma, and subject to (1.5) and (1.6), and an IC constraint:
0 E arg max f (et,Vt) + E' [dVt|
s>O
and an appropriate transversality condition. Using Ito's lemma and the law of motion for n, we
write the IC constraint as:
V,' (Xt, nt) ptkt ($- + (1 - < 0
which for V (Xt, nt) > 0 boils down to
This is the HJB equation that characterizes the portfolio problem with the equity constraint in
Definition 3. So if we solve that problem, we can build an optimal contract using the solution, as
follows. Let H (X, n) be the value function of the portfolio problem.47 We will use it for V. Let
8, g, fe, 0) be the optimal policy functions. Consumption and capital holdings are built et - Btnt
and kt = ktnt, while gt requires no transformation, and we define the cash flow F as
d(Ft = nt rtdt + ptct (dR - rtdt - Bdt -)
Finally, under no stealing, we can identify a history of Z and Wi with a history of Z and Rf,
so (8, g, k, F) can be taken as functions of the histories of observables Z and Rk, and hence Wt-
adapted. Because in the portfolio problem nt 2 0 and there is no stealing, bt - Jt = be = nt > 0 is
satisfied in the contract. The value function of the portfolio problem is in fact twice continuously
differentiable, so we have a classical solution to the HJB. Finally, we can use the fact that this is
the solution to a portfolio problem to verify that E? [fto A&dF = 0 for all (w, t), so the present
value of the contract Jt is in fact 0 at all times.
1.7.1 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Extend the expert's problem to allow him to chose his stealing s. If he steals, he adds a flow
$ptktstdt to his net worth, but he loses the flow Optktstdt because he owns the fraction q of his own
equity. He will then choose not to steal if and only if
ptkt $- St < 0 <= > 0
So he will chose s = 0. The extended problem then boils down to the constrained portfolio problem
in Definition 3, and the expert can be allowed to chose his (e, g, , 0, 5) on his own, subject only
4 7 I'm already using the fact it will be markov in the aggregate state variables X (v, x). In general it would be
H (w, t, n).
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to the equity constraint. This requires observing his choice of <I, i.e. how much of his own equity
he keeps. E
1.8 Appendix B: More proofs
1.8.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Without any financial frictions, idiosyncratic risk can be perfectly shared and has zero price
in equilibrium. Capital then must be priced by arbitrage
, a - t (git _)gi,t + p/,p,t + ap,,t + t - rt = rt (a + apt) (1.25)
and experts face the same portfolio problem as consumers, with the exception of the choice of the
growth rate g, pinned down by the static FOC
t' (gt) = Pt
We have, in effect, a standard representative agent model with a stationary growth path with
risk-free interest rate:
1
rt = p + ogt - - (1 + 0)7Y22
and price of aggregate risk
In a stationary equilibrium the price of capital is constant so we have pp,t = op,t = 0, and replacing
all of this in (1.25) gives (1.8). For the agents' problem to be well defined we need p - (1 - 7P)g* +
(1- ?p) ao2 > 0, since otherwise they could achieve infinite utility. E
1.8.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. From (1.16) we see that if u-, = 0 then ox,t = 0. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic volatility of
capital, vt is then deterministic because it is the solution to an ODE (1.2). We can replace vt with t
in the Markov equilibrium (and obtain a time-dependent equilibrium). The only possibly stochastic
state variable is xt, but we have seen that it can only have a stochastic drift. However, since all
equilibrium objects are functions of x and time t, then by (1.10) we see that xt is the deterministic
solution to a time-dependent ODE. E
1.8.3 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. We solve the experts' problem with the added constraint that Ot = tB. The FOC for bt
yields:
Bort = B'- + Bke
-y -
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with an analogous condition for consumers. Let's build the equilibrium with no balance sheet
channel, where ag,, = at = ap,t = 0, it follows that Ba',t =B', and from market clearing we
obtain
Bo't = 0
In addition, from the formula for Un,t
1
at = <p-a + OtB
Because o is in the row space of B, we can write a = nB for some K E Rd, so we get oa,t = htB,
and cr,t = xt (ue - a) = mtB. Then we obtain
BB'm' = 0
from which it follows that mt = 0, and axt = 0. By the same argument as in Proposition 9, xt is
deterministic. 0
1.9 Appendix C: solving for the equilibrium
The strategy to solve for the equilibrium when uncertainty shocks hit the economy is to first use
optimality and market clearing conditions to obtain expressions for equilibrium objects in terms of
the stochastic processes for p, , (, and then use Ito's lemma to map the problem into a system of
partial differential equations. In order to obtain a non-degenerate stationary long-run distribution
for x, I also introduce turnover among experts: they retire with independent Poisson arrival rate
T > 0. When they retire they don't consume their wealth right away, they simply become consumers.
Without turnover, experts want to postpone consumption and approach xt -+ 1 as t -+ oo. Turnover
modifies experts' HJB slightly:
- max ~p + -1 +pn-6+p (+ oi - 2(1 -y)ono + &n
(1.26)
With Poisson intensity r the expert retires and becomes a consumer, losing the continuation utility
of an expert, but gaining that of a consumer. For this reason, consumers' wealth multiplier (
appears in experts' HJB equation. Consumers have the same HJB equation as before. The FOC
for consumption for experts and consumers are:
P _0T
1 tk-1
c =p~C~
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So market clearing in the consumption goods market requires:
p , ( +x +( (1 - X)) (1.27)
Equation (1.16) provides a formula for ax
(1 - x)xY! (
1r - (1 - V V'L
We can use Ito's lemma to obtain expressions for
PP 'xC
and the definition of a from (1.10) to obtain and expression for
Then we use experts FOC for aggregate risk sharing (1.12) to obtain an expression for the price of
aggregate risk
7r = en + (y- 1)ag
Consumers' exposure to aggregate risk is taken from (1.13):
11 7-1
Experts' exposure to idiosyncratic risk is given by &n = v. We can now use consumers' budgetX
constraint to obtain the drift of their wealth (before consumption)
pz = r + raw
and plugging into their HJB equation we obtain an expression for the risk-free interest rate
rz 05z - r7( 1C 22(1 
-- y\wC
where the only term which hasn't been solved for yet is ptC. We use the FOC for capital (1.11) and
the expression for the risk-free interest rate and plug into the formula for yn from equation (1.6) to
get
p, = r + 7- (<v)2 +1ran
atpk(ov)
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In equilibrium experts receive the risk-free interest on their net worth, plus a premium for the
idiosyncratic risk they carry through capital, y (#v)2 , and a risk premium for the aggregate risk
they carry, iro,. This allows us to compute the drift of the endogenous state variable x in terms of
known objects, from (1.10) (appropriately modified for turnover) and (1.11)
I~tX = -. 7 z-er + a - t -r -ir (a+ a) - 1 (01_)2 + (a + a) 2 _-an(oa +ap)p X
Turnover works to reduce the fraction of aggregate wealth that belongs to experts through the term
-T. Using Ito's lemma we get expressions for the drift of p, , and (:
Pv JV PXx +(pRLI,2 + 2 Lvx-a, /i2 o* + P -x
P p 2 p P p /
A ~~ ~ AV +-X/x a2v + 2-u ,V Vtx + -ui X
Finally, experts' HJB (1.26) and their FOC for capital (1.11) provide two second order partial
differential equations in p, (, and (. Together with (1.27) they characterize the markov equilibrium.
The idiosyncratic volatility vt moves exogenously in (0, oc), and we conjectured that x E (0, 1).
The system never reaches any of its boundaries, so they play no role in the solution. I verify this
numerically after obtaining the equilibrium solution. We must only make sure that p, (, and ( are
strictly positive and the transversality conditions are satisfied.
1.10 Appendix D: Stochastic moral hazard
I first provide a proof of the equivalence between shocks to v and shocks to #.
1.10.1 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. By inspection of the equations that characterize the equilibrium, we see # and v enter only
in the idiosyncratic risk experts take On,t = -#vt and the pricing equation for capital
a-ittgt + pp't + o-oh~ + a - rt = (or + up,t ) 7rt + -- (#V0 2Pt Xt
Then we can take #v as the state variable that characterizes the Markov equilibrium, and it doesn't
matter whether # or v is being shocked, except for the implementation Ot = n,t - ( (o- + p t). l
In order to illustrate the solution technique when the boundary x =1 is reached, I solve the
model for intertemporally linear preferences, b = 0. Otherwise, the solution technique is similar
to the one for the baseline model, with different boundary conditions. With infinite EIS, experts
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postpone consumption until x = 1. Consumers must then consume all the economy's output
(a - tt) Kt. From the FOC for consumption, we know that ( = p and ( > p while x < 1. This
already implies that a( = p( = 0, so consumers don't have a hedging motive for aggregate risk
sharing. The general equilibrium interest rate and price of risk adjust endogenously to keep them
indifferent between consuming and saving. The equation for a. then simplifies to:
1 (1 -xx
and the HJB for consumers yields a simple formula for the risk-free interest rate:
1 r2
r = p- --
The equation for market clearing can now be dropped, so we have two second-order partial differ-
ential equations for p (#, x) and (, x), given by experts' HJB and the pricing equation for capital.
The boundary behavior is different, however. Not only do we have reflective- boundaries at # = 0
and # = 1, but we also have an absorbing state at x 1. When the system reaches x = 1, consumers
go bankrupt and drop out of the economy. With r 0, this is an absorbing state, and the economy
only has experts from then on. Since consumers are out of the picture, experts must now consume
so ( = p is required at the x = 1 boundary. Since consumers cannot lend to experts, nor share
aggregate risk with them, o-2 = t2 = 0 (which is consistent with x = 1 being an absorbing state).
The risk-free interest rate is now priced by experts' HJB equation rBC _ -_ ) -2
Experts' FOC for capital is a second-order ODE for pBC (), with boundary conditions given by
the reflective boundaries, pfC (0) = pC (1) 0.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Financial Contracts with
Recontracting
2.1 Introduction
Consider the problem of a risk-averse agent who wants to raise funds and share risk with a risk-
neutral principal, but faces a moral hazard problem: he can secretly steal/divert funds to a private
account. Since the private benefit is purely pecuniary, if the agent could commit to a long-term
contract that controls his consumption the first best with full insurance could be implemented. In
order to obtain a tractable but binding moral hazard problem, I introduce recontracting: at any
point the agent can offer a new contract to the principal and rollover his obligations. This allows
him to use the previously stolen funds to consume and invest and creates a moral hazard problem.
This setting is quite natural in macro and financial applications. It is in fact a discrete-time analogi
of the setting I use in Di Tella (2013). In order to obtain a tractable solution, I allow the agent
to steal after privately observing the current noise. This imposes a linear structure on the model
that greatly simplifies the analysis. The main result in this paper is that the optimal contract can
be characterized as the solution to a standard portfolio problem with a linear "skin in the game"
constraint. And because the model requires very few restrictions on preferences and shocks, it can
be easily incorporated into general equilibrium macro and financial models.
I consider an investment game where the agent trades and uses capital to produce consumption
goods. In order to share risk, he sells a cash flow to a principal, who values it with a state price
density. In order to make the problem easy to use in macro and financial applications, I distinguish
between non-observable idiosyncratic shocks (which will create the moral hazard problem by "hiding"
the agent's stealing) and observable aggregate shocks, which not only affect the return of the project
but also general equilibrium conditions. An important assumption is that the principal does not
price idiosyncratic risk, so in the first best there is full insurance for idiosyncratic risk. I also impose
'In that paper the volatility of the idiosyncratic shock is itself an aggregate (observable) stochastic variable.
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few constraints on preferences and on the stochastic process for shocks, and take general equilibrium
prices as arbitrary functions of the history of aggregate shocks.
A moral hazard problem arises because the agent can secretly divert capital to a private account
and sell it. He only gets < E (0, 1) units of capital per unit diverted, so stealing is inefficient. I
first focus on contracts that implement no stealing at all time, and then show this is without loss
of generality. I use a timing convention as in Edmans and Gabaix (2011) or DeMarzo and Fishman
(2007), which greatly simplifies the analysis. Whereas in standard moral hazard problems the
private action is taken before the realization of shocks, here I assume that the agent first observes
the shocks and then decides how much to steal. Incentive compatibility needs to be satisfied state-
by-state (for every shock realization), rather than in expectation, constraining the set of admissible
contracts and imposing a linear structure.
Private fund diversion is, however, not enough to create a moral hazard problem on its own.
A salient feature of the setting is that the private benefit from stealing is purely pecuniary. The
agent doesn't get utility from stealing per se, only from consumption, so if he is committed to a
long-term contract that controls his consumption, the first best with full idiosyncratic insurance
can be achieved. To create a moral hazard problem I introduce a form of limited commitment. At
the beginning of any period the agent can offer a new contract that gives the principal at least the
same continuation value as under the original contract. This allows him to use his stolen funds to
consume and invest. By stealing the agent increases his hidden savings, but reduces the observed
return of the project. In order to induce no stealing the contract gives the agent some "skin in the
game", so that if the observed return is low his legitimate net worth must fall to undo the private
benefit of stealing. I first assume that whenever the agent recontracts (or writes the contract at
t = 0), his full hidden savings are observable. I then relax this assumption and show that the agent
willingly reveals his full hidden savings as soon as possible. The intuition for this result is that since
incentive compatibility constraints don't interact with the agent's wealth (legitimate or hidden), it
is always optimal to put his hidden savings into the contract.
I then consider the case of state-contingent private action. The timing convention which simpli-
fies the contract when we want to implement no stealing at all times also introduces the possibility
of implementing a "stealing function". It might be the case that by allowing the agent to steal
after some realization of the shocks, the contract might be able to relax risk-sharing sufficiently
to overcome the cost of stealing. However, this is not the case, and it is optimal to implement no
stealing at all times.
This paper is most closely connected to the literature on financial contracting with pecuniary
benefits, such as DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). In both models
the agent can inefficiently divert funds to a private account. He can then use those funds to
secretly consume, but he is committed to a long-term contract. Because preferences are linear in
those papers, the contract can be solved assuming all stolen funds must be immediately consumed,
and this turns out to be optimal for the agent even if he could secretly save. The drawback of
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this approach is that with risk-averse preferences the contract becomes more difficult to solve,
making it less appealing for macro and financial applications which typically require risk-aversion.
Edmans and Gabaix (2011) and Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2011) also use the timing
convention in this paper to derive tractable incentive contracts in a setting with full commitment (In
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) stealing also occurs after the agent observes the cash flow). In a macro
setting, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) use a similar setting with cash flow diversion and lack of
commitment (no lock-ups) in a continuous-time setting where shocks and the private action occur
simultaneously. In their setting, however, there are no idiosyncratic shocks, but aggregate shocks
are taken to be unobservable 2 . By explicitly allowing for both observable aggregate shocks and non-
observable idiosyncratic shocks I can better distinguish the type of risk-sharing that is constrained
by the moral hazard problem. He and Krishnamurthy (2011) use a short-term contracts approach,
with the same observability restrictions as in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012). In Di Tella (2013)
I use a continuous-time analog of the setting in this paper, with the addition that the volatility of
the idiosyncratic shock is an aggregate (observable) stochastic variable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the model and solve for
the first best optimal contract without moral hazard. I also show that with full commitment to
long-term contracts that control the agent's consumption the first best can be achieved. In Section
3 I introduce recontracting and characterize optimal contracts that implement no stealing at all
times, under the assumption that all hidden savings are fully revealed upon recontracting. I then
relax this assumption and show it is without loss of generality. Finally, I consider state-contingent
private actions, and show it is optimal to implement no stealing at all times. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Setup
Time is discrete with finite horizon t E T = {0, 1, ... T}. A risk-averse agent can trade and use
capital to produce, and wants to share risk with a principal who is risk-neutral with respect to
idiosyncratic risk.
At the beginning of period t, the agent buys kt units of capital at price pt, he produces output
akt in consumption goods (the numeraire), and obtains at the end of the period
kt+1 = kt(1 + et + ut - st)
units of capital. Here et - iid is an observable aggregate shock with interval support [e, e], ut - iid
a private idiosyncratic shock with interval support [1, U], both with Efet] = E[ut] = 0. After
observing et and ut, the agent can steal capital st. His stealing must be consistent with a bad
realization of the idiosyncratic shock (otherwise the agent can be punished), so he is restricted to
2 Otherwise there wouldn't be a moral hazard problem in their setting.
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choosing st E [0, ut -uI. To make sure k 2 0, I assume e+u> -1. With some abuse of notation, I
will refer to Rt = et + ut - st as the "return" of capital, which is observable. For each unit of capital
stolen the agent can keep only a fraction # E (0,1), which he must immediately sell at price Pt+1,
so that his hidden savings evolve3:
St+1 = St(1 + rt) + #Pt+1ktst
The parameter # captures the severity of the moral hazard problem. With # 0, for example,
there is no moral hazard. Because # < 1, stealing is inefficient: in the first best where st is observable
there is no stealing (st = 0 always). In fact, no stealing will always be optimal. The approach I
take here is to first solve for the optimal contract that implements no stealing, and then show that
this is actually optimal.
Capital is traded in a competitive market with price pt, and there is a complete financial market
with state price density re (with an implied risk-free interest rate rt). Both the price of capital
and the state price density are functions of the history of aggregate shocks et = (eo, ei, ... et-1),
with e0 = 0. Notice the aggregate shocks that affect the return to capital may also have general
equilibrium effects on prices. I don't model the general equilibrium here. The objective is to derive
the optimal contract for any general equilibrium prices. In particular, the financial market does not
price idiosyncratic risk ut. I will typically suppress the dependence of pt and qt on et to simplify
notation.
The agent has an observable bank balance starting with bo > 0 funds, which evolves:
bt+1 = bt(1 + rt) + akt + pt+1kt(1 + Rt) - ptkt(1 + rt) - ct(1 + rt) - Ft+1 (2.1)
where ct is the agent's consumption at the beginning of period t, and Ft+1 a cash payment from
the agent to the principal at the end of period t.
Timing. To summarize, each period t the following happens:
1. The agent choses capital kt and consumes ct
2. shocks (et, ut) are observed by the agent, who then chooses st
3. the return Rt = et + ut - st and the aggregate shock et are observed by everyone.
4. the agent pays Ft+1 to the principal
5. the agent secretly sells4 his stolen capital #ktst, at price pt+1 and adds it to his hidden savings
St+1
3 Here I assume his hidden savings yield the risk-free interest rate rt which will be explained below.
4We could also imagine this happening at the beginning of period t + 1.
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Histories. We already introduced the history of aggregate shocks e' = (eo, e, ... , et-1). The
history of capital returns Rt = (Ro, R 1 , ..., Rt-1) is also observable, so the observable history 5 is h=
(et, R). The agent also observes the history of his private idiosyncratic shock ut = (uo, u1, ..., Ut-1),
so his privately observed history xt = (e', ut).6 The stealing activity of the agent is a contingent
plan s = {st(xt, et, ut) }. Therefore, the history of returns Rt is a function of the history of shocks
and the contingent stealing plan of the agent. With some abuse of notation I will sometimes write
s = 0 to mean the stealing strategy s with st(xt+1) = 0 Vxt+1.
Contracts. A contract C = (c, k, F, b) specifies consumption c {ct(ht) > 0; t E T}, capital
k = {kt(ht) 0; t E T}, cash flows F {Ft+1(ht, et, Rt); t E T}, and the bank account of the agent
b = {bt(ht); t E T}. Given a contract C the agent chooses his stealing plan s {st(xt, et, ut); t E T}
to solve
maxE" #Z3t(ct(ht))
8 t~o 
.
where the expectation is taken over the shocks e and u, and under the stealing plan s. Call s(C)
the optimal stealing plan for the agent given contract C. The principal values the continuation
contract C after history ht as the conditional present value of the promised cash flow (he just sells
the equilibrium payoff on the financial market) given by:7
Jt(ht) -- Es(C) [ZT/u+1(hU1) lht]
The principal's participation constraint is Jo(h) > 0, and in order to make the problem well
defined I add a solvency constraint: bt(ht) - Jt(ht) > 0 Vht. The agent must always have enough
funds to cover the present value of cash flow he promised to the principal. We say a contract is
feasible if b satisfies the budget constraint (2.1) with b(h) = bo given, the solvency constraint
bt(ht) - Jt(ht) > 0 Vht and the participation constraint of the principal Jo 0. A feasible contract
is incentive compatible if s(C) = 0. An incentive compatible contract is optimal if it maximizes the
agent's expected utility.
E*=0 (: Otu(ct(h* ))
lt=o .
It will be useful to define the legitimate net worth of the agent as nt(ht) = bt(ht) - Jt(ht) for
all ht. We can characterize feasible contracts with the following result:
Proposition 16. If C = (c, k, F, b) is a feasible contract, then the agent's legitimate net worth
5 All histories at time t = 0 are 0.
6 Since he controls his stealing activity, R' = et + ut - st is superfluous for the agent.
7 The expectation is also conditional on the initial bank balance of the agent, bo which is known. When I introduce
recontracting later, the principal will also condition on the recontracting history.
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nt(ht) = bt(ht) - Jt(ht) satisfies:
nt+,(ht,et, Rt) = nt(h)(1 + rt) + akt(ht ) + pt+1kt(ht )(1 + Rt) (2.2)
-pkt(ht )(1 + rt) - ct(ht)(1 + rt) - mt+1(ht, et , Rt)
for some process m = {mt+1(ht, et, Rt); t E T} such that
ES(C) [+1 mt+1(ht et, Rt)Iht =0 (2.3)
with nt(ht) 0 for all ht, and n(h0 ) < bo.
Conversely, given processes c, k, n and m satisfying equations (2.2) and (2.3), and with nt(ht)
0 for all ht and n(h0 ) ! bo, there is a cash flow F and bank balance b such that (c, k, F, b) is a feasible
contract.
Proof. In the first direction, take a feasible contract C = (c, k, F, b). From the definition of nt we
have (suppressing the history dependence)
nt+1 = bt+1 - Jt+1
nt+1 = bt(1 + rt) + akt + pt+1kt(1 + Rt) - ptkt(1 + rt) - ct(1 + rt) - Ft+1 - Jt+1
and we can write (where the notation is straightforward)
Jt = Es(c) 1 + Fu+1 ] Es(c) [lt+1 (Ft+1 + Jt+1)
So if we define mt+1(ht, et, Rt) = Ft+1(ht, et, Rt) + Jt+1(ht , et, Rt) - Jt(ht)(1 + rt) we have
Es(c) [W+1mt+1(ht+1) 0
and we obtain equation (2.2) and (2.3) as desired. In addition, because a feasible contract has
bt(ht) - Jt(ht) > 0 for all ht and Jo 0, we get nt(ht) > 0 for all ht and n(ho) = bo - Jo bo.
In the other direction, first let's say that n(ho) = bo and we will set Jt(ht) = 0 for all ht so that
bt(ht) = nt(ht) for all ht satisfies the budget constraint. To do this, let Ft+1(ht+1) = mt+i(ht+1)
and we can verify that in fact
T 'T ~T-
Jt = Es(c) z 1u+ 1 =l Es(c) 
-+1mU+1 = Es(c) [ E*(c) L+7u+1J 0
1U=t I 1U=t I .. u t 77.
Because nt (ht ) > 0 we also have bt(ht) - Jt(ht) > 0. If instead no(ho) < bo, let Jo(ho) = bo - no(hO)
and F1(h1) - m1(hl) + Jo(1+ro). All the other Ft for t = 2...T +1 are as before. So Jt(ht) = 0 for
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all ht with t > 1, and Jo(ht)) = bo - no(h0 ) as desired. Now bo(hO) - bo as required by feasibility
and bt(ht) = nt(ht ) for all ht with t > 1 satisfied the budget constraint (we use money from the bank
balance to cancel the outstanding debt to the principal in period8 t = 1). The resulting contract is
therefore feasible as desired. l
In light of Proposition 16, we can work with (c, k, n, m) instead of (c, k, F, b). Equations (2.2)
and (2.3) take the form of a dynamic budget constraint. The agent can use m to Share risk with
the financial market via de principal.
2.2.2 First Best without moral hazard
As a benchmark, let us first solve for the optimal contract without moral hazard: st is now con-
tractible and can be set to 0 after all histories xt+1.
Proposition 17 (First best). The optimal contract without moral hazard C = (c, k, n, m) solves the
following problem
' T
max E = 1 #U(ct(ht))
(c,k,n,m) 
,t=ou.
nt+1(ht+1) = nt(ht)(1 + rt) + akt(ht ) + pt+1kt(ht )(1 + Rt)
-ptkt(h t )(1 + rt) - ct(ht)(1 + rt) - mt(ht+l)
Es=O [1t+1lmt+1(ht+1)Iht= 0
no(ho) <; bo nt(ht) 0 Vht
Notice the expectation in the budget constraint is now taken under no stealing. The first best
contract is the solution to a standard portfolio problem. An important property of this portfolio
problem is that it has full insurance for idiosyncratic risk ut, since the principal is effectively risk-
neutral with respect to idiosyncratic risk while the principal is risk-averse.
Proposition 18. The first best contract without moral hazard has full insurance against idiosyn-
cratic risk. For two histories ht = (et, Rt), and ht = (Et, fit) which differ only in the idiosyncratic
shock, i.e. et = et, we have ct(ht) = ct(ht).
Proof. This is a standard result.
5We can also add an initial payment in the contract to do this, but it is not necessary to obtain the result.
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2.2.3 Moral hazard with full commitment
Now we can add moral hazard back in. In order to implement no stealing, we need to add the
incentive compatibility constraint to the problem.
0 E arg max E's ,#u(ct(h'))
Because the first best contract has full insurance with respect to idiosyncratic risk, as per Proposition
18, the stealing activity of the agent has no effect on his consumption and hence his utility under this
contract. Because the private benefit of stealing is purely pecuniary, and the contract controls his
consumption, stealing does not benefit the agent, and so the first best contract is, in fact, incentive
compatible.
Proposition 19. Under full commitment, the first best contract is also incentive compatible and
hence the optimal contract.
One approach to make the moral hazard problem binding is to make the agent's consumption
unobservable, so that he can use his hidden savings to consume. If the agent must immediately
consume what he steals, we have the setting in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), for example'. Here
instead, I will introduce recontracting.
2.3 Recontracting
In this section I introduce recontracting. At the beginning of period t the agent has contract
C = (c, k, F, b). He can offer a new contract C (a, k, F, b) to the principal. The new contract
specifies consumption a, capital k, cash payments F and the observable bank account of the agent
b for the continuation histories of ht. Assume for now that, just as the agent's initial bank balance
bo was observable, when the agent recontracts he reveals his hidden savings S and adds them to
his observable bank balance bt, so bt(ht) = bt(ht) + S. I will later show how this is without loss of
generality. If the continuation value for the principal with the new contract is higher than with the
old one, then the principal accepts the new contract. Otherwise, they keep the old contract.
Let V(ht, C, S) be the value function of an agent that after history ht has contract C and
S > 0 in hidden savings (the result of previous stealing activity). Faced with contract C the
agent choses a stealing strategy s = {st(xt, et, ut); t E T} and a stopping time10 r, to maximize
Es ['o /tu(ct(ht)) + /3TV(h T , C, Sr(xt)]. We say a feasible contract is incentive compatible if the
optimal stealing strategy s(C) = 0. As before, an incentive compatible contract is optimal if it
maximizes the agent's utility.
OWith hidden savings and unobservable consumption the problem becomes considerably more difficult unless the
agent is risk-neutral. This is in fact the case considered in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006).
'
0 A stopping time is a random variable r(XT) E T adapted to the filtration generated by the private history xt .
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Proposition 20. The value function for the agent at any t, after any history ht with incentive
compatible contract C and hidden savings S takes the form
Vt(ht, C, S) = Vt(e', bt(ht) - Jt(h') + S)
and is strictly increasing and concave in the second argument. A feasible contract C = (c, k, n, m)
has
mt+1(ht, et, Rt) = Tt+I(ht, et) + pt+1kt(ht)(1 - 0)(Rt - et - 1) Vht, et, Rt, t < T
Proof: The proof is by backwards induction, as follows.
Last period t = T. At the beginning of period t = T, after history ht the agent has incentive
compatible contract C = (c, k, F, b) and hidden savings from previous stealing activity S. Let
VT(hT, C, S) be his value function. He can keep the old contract C, in which case he gets
VJN R(h ,C, S) = U(cT(hT
Since this is the last period, he can't do anything with his hidden savings ST+1, so whatever stealing
he does has no effect on his utility and he might as well not steal. There is in fact no moral hazard
problem. The continuation value of C for the principal is therefore
JT(h ) = =ES= rO +1 FT+1(hT+1)IhT]
Note that the agent's hidden savings S are irrelevant for this computation. The agent can instead
offer a new continuation contract d = (, Ic, P, b). For this contract there is no moral hazard as well,
so the continuation value for the principal if he accepts the new contract is
JT Es=O [T+1 PT+1(hT+1)|hT
He will accept if and only if JT > JT(hT). This condition is in fact the principal's participation
constraint for the new contract. As before we can work with ( h, ,,7n), so the agent can design
the new contract solving the following problem.
VR(hT,C,S) = max u(c)
c,k,n'(eT,RT),m(eT,RT)
st: n'(eT,RT) =nT(1+rT) +akT+pT+lk(1 +RT) -pTk(1 +rT) -c(1 +rT) -m(eT,RT)
Es=O mT+lM(eT, RT) Ih T 0
nT bT(hT) - JT(hT) + S n'(eT, RT) > 0VeT, RT
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The old contract C of course satisfies the constraints (because S > 0), so Vf(hT, C, 5) > VNR(hT, C, S)
for any C, any hT and any S > 0. It is always optimal for the agent to recontract at time t T.
VT(hCs) = max {VT (hT,C, S); VT (h=,C,S)} VT(hT,C, S)
Notice furthermore that S and C enter the problem only through br(hT) - JT(hT) + S. So we can
write VTR(hT, C, S) VfT(eT, b(ht) - J(ht) + S). Any contract C that leaves the agent with the
same total funds (legitimate net worth b - J plus hidden funds S) will yield the same continuation
utility (and continuation contract). In addition, a higher b - J + S relaxes the constraints, so
VT(eT, b - J + S) is increasing in the second argument. And because the constraints are linear in
b - J + S and the objective function concave, we see that VT(eT, b - J + S) is concave in the second
argument. The history of aggregate shocks eT still matters because it affects prices (p and 'r). We
conclude that at t = T it is always optimal for the agent to recontract, and his continuation utility
at the beginning of period t = T is VT(eT, b - J +S) which is strictly increasing and concave in the
second argument.
Periods before the last t < T. At the beginning of period t < T, after history ht, the agent
has feasible contract C, and hidden savings S. Assume the value function for next period, for any
incentive compatible contract C, takes the form Vt+,(ht+1,C, ') Vt+1(et+1, b - j+S'), increasing
and concave in the second argument, and where I denote d the contract the agent has at the
beginning of period t + 1 (it could be different from C) and b, i and S' are also the values of these
variables at t + 1 under contract d. Under contract C, the agent can chose how much to steal
contingent on the shocks et and ut he observes:
max E" [#Vt+,(et+1, bt+(ht, et, Rt) - Jt+,(ht, et, Rt) + S'(ht, et, ut))Iht]st(et,ut)
st st(et, ut) E [0, ut - _I Vet, ut
where" S'(ht, et, ut) = S(1 + rt) + #pt+1kt(ht )st(et, ut). Since we want to implement no stealing
for all et and ut, we can get rid of the expectation, and since Vt+1(et+1, b' - J' + S') is increasing in
the second argument, we only need to optimize b - J + S = n + S. Using Proposition 16 we obtain
the condition that for each (et, ut)
st(et, ut) E arg max nt(1 + rt) + akt + pt+1kt(1 + et +ut - s) - ptkt(1 + rt)
sE[O,ut-uI f -ct(1+ rt) - mt+,(ht,et,1 + et +ut - s) + S(1 ± rt) + $pt+1kts
"Also remember that the price of capital pt±i and the interest rate rt are functions of the history of aggregate
shocks, but as before I suppress the notation to avoid clutter.
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where I suppress the dependence on the history to simplify notation (e.g. kt(ht) -+ kt, or mt+I(ht, et, Rt) -+
mt+1(et, Rt)). This in turn simplifies to
st(et, ut) E arg max {pt+Ikt(1 + et + ut - s) - mt+1(et, 1 + et + ut - s) + $pt+1kts}
sE[Out-I
Notice that the agent's hidden savings S and his legitimate net worth nt = bt - Jt are not relevant
for the decision of how much to steal. Not stealing (s = 0) is optimal for all et and ut if and only if
V(et, ut, s E [0, Ut - A)
pt+1 kt(1 +et +mt - s) -mt+1(et, 1+et +ut - s) +$Opt+lkts pt+1kt(l+et +lt) -mt+1(et, 1 +et +ut)
4==> mt+1(et, 1 + et + ut) - mt+1(et, 1 + et + ut - s) - pt+1kt(1 - $)s 0
This in turn implies that the function g(et, y) = mt+1(et, y) - pt+1 kt(1 - $)y is decreasing in y for
all y E [u, U] and for all et. The function g(et, y) must therefore be almost everywhere differentiable
with respect to y, for any et , with at most a countable number of downward jump discontinuities.
The function mt+1 (et, Rt) inherits some of these properties: it must also be almost everywhere
differentiable with respect to R with at most a countable number of jump discontinuities, with
derivative (where it exists):
Omt+ 1(et, Rt) < Pt+1kt(1 
- 4)Vet, Rt
ORt
Because the agent is risk-averse (recall the value function for next period is concave) and the
principal risk-neutral with respect to idiosyncratic risk, and because to achieve full insurance we
would like to set nt+1(et, R) = Wt+I(et) + pt+1ktut we can without loss of generality restrict our
attention to contracts where
mt+1(et, Rt) = Yt+1(et) + pt+1kt(1 - $)(Rt - et - 1)
The agent's legitimate net worth is then
nt+1 = tt(l + rt) + akt + pt+1kt(1 + Rt) - ptkt(1 + rt)
-ct(1 + rt) - Wt+1(et) - pt+1kt(1 - $)(Rt - et - 1)
And as a function of et and ut (which he observes), his total funds net period nt+1 + St+1 are
nt+ +St+1 (nt + St)(1 +rt) + akt +pt+1 kt(1 + et) -ptkt(1 +rt) - ct(1 +rt)
-'nt+i(et) + pt+1kt$(ut - s) + pt+1ktos
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Stealing does not affect his future total funds and so we verify the contract is incentive compatible.
As a result of the incentive compatibility constraint, the agent ends up exposed to his idiosyncratic
risk through #pt+1ktut. But at least he is able to get rid of fraction 1 - # of this risk. On the other
hand, moral hazard does not limit his ability to share aggregate risk as he sees fit. He must only
satisfy the present value condition:
ES=O [h+T t+l~(et)Rt)Iht] s~O [77+1Tit+ 1 (et) ± -pt~lktl -q)(ut-s)tht] =0
,# Es F 71+f~ (et)Jht l
If the agent starts period t with contract C which is incentive compatible, then if he does not
recontract, he obtains utility 12
vtNR(htC,S) = u(ct(h t )) +3E*= [Vt+1(et+1,nt+1(ht+1) + S(1 + rt))Ixt|
The principal, on the other hand, knows that if he stays with contract C which is incentive compatible
he obtains continuation value Jt (and recall he doesn't need to know St to make sure the contract
is incentive compatible). The agent can offer a new contract C, revealing his hidden savings and
adding them to his bank balance, and the new contract must provide the principal with at least
the same level of continuation value: it > Jt(ht). So an agent with incentive compatible contract
C, after history ht, and with hidden savings S, can offer the principal a new continuation contract
and obtain utility
VR(ht, C,)= max u(c) + E= 0 [Vt+l (et+1, n'(et, Rt))]
(c,k,n/(et,Rt),r-n(et)
st: n'(et,Rt) nt(1+rt)+ak+pt+1k(1+et)-ptk(1+rt)-c(1+rt)
-Yf(et) + pt+1kt#(Rt - et - 1)
ES=O [t+17(et)|ht =0
ut bt(ht) - Jt(ht) + S n'(et, Rt) _> 0 Vet, Rt
As before, the old contract C and the agent's hidden savings S enter only through bt(ht) -
Jt(ht) + S, so VR(ht,C, S) = VR(et, b - J + S), and because a larger bt(ht) - Jt(ht) + S relaxes
the constraint, VtR is increasing in the second variable. The constraints are linear and the objective
function concave in b - J + S, so the value function must be concave as well. In addition, the old
12the expectation is conditional on his information set, but this is equivalent to using ht since the agent's knowledge
of his past stealing behavior is not relevant as long as we know St.
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contract C also satisfies the constraints, so we have VtR(ht, C, S) VtNR(ht, C, S) and therefore
Vt(hT, C, S) = VtR(et, b(ht) - J(ht) + S)
is the value function for the agent. The agent always chooses to recontract (and reveal his hidden
savings to the principal). By induction (backwards) we obtain the desired result. E
Optimal contract under recontracting. In light of Proposition 20, we can characterize the
optimal contract under recontracting as the solution to the following portfolio problem.
Proposition 21. The optimal contract with recontracting C = (c, k, n, m) solves the following prob-
lem:
max E # u(ct(ht))
c(ht),k(ht),L(ht,et) t=(o
st nt+i(ht+1) - nt(ht)(1 +rt)+ akt(ht ) + pt+1kt(ht)(l+ et) - ptkt(h t )(1+rt)
-ct(ht)(1 + rt) - mt+1(ht, et , Rt) Vht, et, Re
mt+1(h t , et, Rt) =4T(ht, et) + pt+1kt(ht )4i(Rt - et - 1) Vht , et, Rt, t < T
E rit11t+ 1(ht,7 et) |ht 0 Vht
no(h 0 ) bo nt(ht) 2 0 Vht
Proposition 21 differs from a standard portfolio problem only in the incentive compatibility
constraint, which forces the agent to keep a fraction # of his idiosyncratic risk pt+1ktut. On the
other hand, the agent is free to use mt+1(ht, et) to share aggregate risk. Moral hazard does not
limit the agent's ability to share aggregate risk, since it does not interact with his stealing activity.
Partial revelation of hidden savings. I have assumed up to this point that if the agent re-
contracts, his hidden savings are fully revealed and added to his legitimate bank balance. This
is without loss of generality, because the incentive compatibility constraints don't depend on his
wealth (legitimate or otherwise). If the agent has S hidden savings, he can chose to reveal S K S
and add them to his legitimate net worth, keeping S - S hidden. Revealing hidden savings will not
affect his incentive compatibility constraints, but it will relax his budget constraint
n'(et, Rt) = nt(1 +rt)+ ak +pt+1k(1+ et) - pk(1+ rt) - c(1 + rt)
-Yh(et) + pt+1 kt4(Rt - et - 1)
nt <bt(ht) - Jt(ht) + 5 n'(et, Rt) 0 Vet, Rt
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and his continuation utility next period is Vt+1(et+1, n'(et, Rt) + (St - 5)(1 + rt)) so that his total
funds next period n'(et, Rt)+St+1 are not affected by this decision. But since the solvency constraint
n'(et, Rt) ;> 0 Vet, Rt applies only to the legitimate net worth, by fully revealing his hidden savings
he relaxes the problem and improves his continuation utility. This means that even though we
ignored truthful revelation conditions (because we assumed that hidden savings became observable),
the agent will willingly reveal all of his hidden savings, and the contract remains incentive compatible
even when hidden savings don't become observable upon recontracting.
2.3.1 State-contingent private action.
Up to this point I have focused on implementing no stealing after any history of shocks. The timing
convention that stealing happens after the agent observes the shocks et and ut make the problem
tractable, but it also opens up the possibility of making stealing contingent on these shocks. It
could be optimal to allow the agent to steal after some shocks in order to improve the sharing of
idiosyncratic risk between the agent and the principal. I will show here, however, that this is not
the case. Implementing no stealing always is in fact optimal. The intuition is as follows: if the agent
is stealing in equilibrium we can always offer him a contract that just gives him whatever he was
stealing in exchange for not stealing anymore. Since stealing involved a loss of capital (the agent
keeps only a fraction # E (0, 1) of what he steals) the new arrangement dominates the old one. It
remains to be seen whether just giving him what he was previously stealing will in fact induce him
to stop stealing. The following result says that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 22. It is optimal to implement no stealing always: st(xt, et, ut) = 0V(xt, et, Ut)
Proof. We know there is no moral hazard problem at t = T and implementing no stealing is therefore
optimal at that point. We also obtained the value function VT(hT, C, S) = VT(eT, bT(hT) - JT(hT) +
S), increasing in the second argument. Now, towards induction, take any other t < T, assuming
the value function for next period takes the same form. After observing (et, ut) the agent choses s
to solve (as before, dropping the dependence on ht to simplify notation)
maxpt+1kt(1 + et + ut - s) - mt(et, 1 + et + ut - s) + $pt+1 kts
If the contract implements some st(et, ut) then a necessary and sufficient condition is V(et, ut, s' E
[0, Ut - u):
pt+1kt(1 + et + ut - s') - mt(et, 1 + et +ut - s') + $pt+1kts' <
pt+1kt(1 + et + ut - st(et, ut)) - mt(et, 1 + et +ut - st(et, ut)) + Ppt+1ktst(et, ut)
or equivalently V(et, ut, s' E [0, Ut - kl)
mt(et,1 +et +ut - st(et,ut)) - mt(et,1 +et +ut - s') - pt+1kt(1 - p)(s' - st(et,ut)) 0 (2.4)
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I will show how we can modify the contract to implement no stealing and leave both the agent and
the principal better off. Define the new m like this:
4i(et, Rt) = m(et, Rt - st(et, Re - et - 1)) + (1 - $)pt+1ktst(et, Rt - et - 1) - A(et)
for some A(et) which will allow us to shift surplus between agent and principal without affecting
incentives. Under in- he choses s to solve:
max pt+1kt(1 + et + ut - s) - ?h(et, I + et + ut - s) + ppt+1kts
sE[,ut-]
and plugging in the new fn. we get:
max pt+1kt(1 +et+ut-s) -m(et, 1+et+ut-s-st(et, ut-s)) -(1 -4)pt+1ktst(et, Ut-S) +Opt+1kts+A(et)
sE[O,ut-ul
In particular, if he choses s = 0 he gets pt+1kt(1 + et + ut) - m(et, 1 + et + ut - st(et, ut)) - (1 -
#)pt+1ktst(et, ut) + A(et), which is what he would have gotten under the old contract by stealing
st(et, ut), plus A(et). Not stealing is optimal for every et and ut if and only if V(et, ut, S' E [0, ut -Ul)
pt+1kt(1+et +ut -s') -m(et, 1+et +ut -s' -st(et,ut -s)) -(1 -4)pt+ 1ktst(et, ut - s' )+$pt+1kts' <
pt+1kt(1 + et + ut) - m(et, 1 + et + ut - st(et, ut)) - (1 - #)pt+1ktst(et, ut)
which after some algebra becomes:
m(et, 1+ et + ut - st(et, ut)) - m(et, 1 + et + ut - s' - st(et, ut - s'))
-(1 - #)pt+1ktst(et, ut - s') - (1 - 4)pt+1kt(s' - st(et, ut)) < 0
Define A = s' + s(et, ut - s'). We know A E [0, ut - u] because st(et, ut - s') ut - s' and both
terms are non-negative. Then we rewrite the condition above V(et, ut, A E [0, ut - _1l)
m(et, 1 + et + ut - st(et, ut)) - m(et, 1 + et + ut - A) - (1 - 4)pt+1kt(A - st(et, ut)) < 0
which is true because of (2.4), that is, because st(et, ut) was optimal under m. Under the new
contract, the principal gets
E [?7t+1 (m(et, ut - st(et, ut)) + (1 - k)pt+1ktst(et, ut) - A(et)) htl
= Et m(et, ut - st(et, ut))Iht + Et [?t+1 ((1 -_)pt+1ktst(eut) - A(et)) Iht
I 7t I t
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the first term is what he was getting before, and the second term is zero if we set
A(et) =E ?7t+i((1 - #)pt+Iktst(et, ut)) > 0
Then the principal is equally well off, but the agent is better off because he pays less (recall if he
doesn't steal he gets what he was getting under the old contract plus A(et) 0). By the same
induction argument as before, this is true for every period, after any history. E
2.4 Conclusion
This paper provides a tractable model of dynamic moral hazard which is readily applicable to macro
and financial general equilibrium models. The two main features are (i) recontracting: the agent
can offer a new contract to the principal at the beginning of any period, and (ii) the agent takes
his private stealing action after he observes the shocks. The timing convention (ii) imposes a linear
structure on the incentive scheme where incentive compatibility conditions must hold state-by-state
rather than in expectation. This linearity in turn helps us deal with the hidden savings problem:
the agent always wants to immediately recontract and fully reveal his hidden savings. The optimal
contract can therefore be characterized as the solution to a standard portfolio problem which takes
general equilibrium prices as given and imposes a "skin in the game" constraint: the agent must
keep some exposure to the return of his project so he doesn't steal. This limits his ability to share
idiosyncratic risk, but not his ability to share aggregate risk.
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Chapter 3
Moral Hazard and the Balance Sheet
Channel
3.1 Introduction
The financial system can play a crucial role in business cycles. If more productive agents have a
very large exposure to aggregate risk, their balance sheets will be hit disproportionally after bad
aggregate shocks. This will reduce their demand for assets, driving asset prices and growth down,
and amplifying and propagating the initial shock. And because it takes time for the balance sheets
to be rebuilt, even transitory shocks can lead to protracted balance sheet recessions. However, we
don't have a good explanation for why these agents are so exposed to aggregate risk in the first place.
Most papers in the literature impose ad-hoc constraints on agents' ability to share aggregate risk1 .
In Di Tella (2013) I show that in standard models of balance sheet recessions driven by Brownian
TFP shocks, the balance sheet channel completely vanishes if agents are allowed to write contracts
on the aggregate state of the economy. I then show how uncertainty shocks, in contrast to TFP
shocks, will endogenously create incentives for more productive agents to take on a disproportionate
fraction of aggregate risk. In this paper I take a different approach: I use a standard growth model
driven by a Brownian TFP shock, and study under what conditions the presence of moral hazard
can distort aggregate risk-sharing and create a balance sheet channel. The main result is that this
will only happen if the agent's private action exposes him to aggregate risk. I then build a model
economy where a balance sheet channel arises, even though agents are able to write contracts on
the aggregate state of the economy.
I use a standard continuous-time growth model with two types of agents: experts and consumers.
Both have the same preferences and can trade and use capital to produce consumption goods, but
experts have higher productivity. They would like to raise funds and share risk in a financial market,
'See for example Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), or more recently Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2011), or Kiyotaki, Gertler, and Queralto (2011).
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but face a moral hazard problem. As in standard models of moral hazard, such as DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2006) or Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), if the agent shirks he reduces the observable
return of the project but receives a private benefit. Where the setting here differs from the standard
setup is that the private benefit carries exposure to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. This can
be interpreted as the reduced form of a richer game where the agent must invest some of his
own funds in a risky activity in order to take advantage of his shirking, or where shirking increases
return volatility which he must mask using his own funds to prevent detection. The main theoretical
result is that the optimal contract will create a distortion in aggregate risk-sharing that will create a
balance sheet channel only if shirking increases the agent's exposure to aggregate risk. The intuition
is as follows: since agents are risk averse, the contract can over-expose them to aggregate risk to
deter them from taking a private action (shirking) that further increases their exposure to aggregate
risk. By doing this it can reduce the agent's exposure to his own observable return, and hence to
his own idiosyncratic risk, so there is a tradeoff between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk-sharing.
To see how this will create a balance sheet channel, recall that the only difference between
experts and consumers is that experts are more productive. Experts will therefore have a higher
demand for capital proportionally to their net worth, and will lever up more. Other things equal,
they will have a proportionally larger exposure to their idiosyncratic risk and will therefore have
a bigger incentive to offload their equity stake in their project onto the market; that is, to reduce
their "skin in the game". In order to credibly promise to not shirk, they will instead take on more
aggregate risk. In other words, because experts are more productive and therefore will manage
more capital, they have larger incentives to take advantage of the tradeoff between aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk-sharing. In equilibrium experts will take a disproportionate fraction of aggregate
risk. When a negative shock hits the economy, their balance sheets will be hit harder and they will
sell capital to consumers, driving asset prices down and reducing growth and output. This is the
balance sheet channel.
In contrast, if shirking does not expose the agent to aggregate risk, the contract can completely
separate incentives from aggregate risk sharing and the balance sheet channel will vanish. It is
perfectly possible for experts to be very highly leveraged and yet carry a small fraction of aggregate
risk, proportional to their net worth. When a negative shock hits the economy both experts and
consumers will loose net worth, but balance sheets will play no role in amplifying or propagating
the aggregate shock.
An important assumption is that financial contracts can be made contingent on the (observable)
aggregate shocks hitting the economy. This can be achieved, for example, by letting agents freely
trade a market index. This is the main difference between this paper and most models in the
literature on balance sheet recessions, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999), or more recently Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy
(2011). In those papers contracts are constrained and cannot be written on the aggregate state of
the economy. This creates a mechanic relationship between leverage and exposure to aggregate risk,
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and since experts are more productive they will be more leveraged than consumers, and hence more
exposed to aggregate risk. Thus incomplete contracts underlie the balance sheet channel in those
models. In contrast, in Di Tella (2013) I allow agents to write optimal contracts on all observable
variables. I keep the standard moral hazard setup and explore the role of the type of structural
shock hitting the economy. I show that more productive agents have incentives to be very highly
exposed to uncertainty shocks in order to take advantage of endogenously stochastic investment
possibility sets. Here instead, I focus on the benchmark Brownian TFP shocks, but generalize the
moral hazard setup to allow the private action to affect the agent's exposure to aggregate risk. Both
papers help understand different aspects of the aggregate risk-sharing puzzle behind balance sheet
recessions and financial crises.
Krishnamurthy (2003) also shows how complete markets sever the feedback from asset prices
back to experts' balance sheets in a discrete-time model based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
In his model, however, experts may still be overexposed to aggregate risk because they might
face a tradeoff between insurance and obtaining funds up front. A similar tradeoff is explored in
Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2012). Limited commitment on the insurers side can also prevent
full aggregate risk-sharing. Krishnamurthy (2003) explores precisely this mechanism, similarly to
Holmstrom and Tirole (1996). Geanakoplos (2009) instead emphasizes the role of heterogeneous
beliefs. More optimistic agents place a higher value on risky assets such as capital, and are naturally
more exposed to aggregate risk. The balance sheet channel in my model, in contrast, does not rely
on heterogenous beliefs. A completely different approach is taken by Myerson (2012), who builds
a model of credit cycles where the interaction of different generations of bankers can generate
endogenous credit cycles, even without aggregate shocks.
Empirically, several papers make the case for balance sheet recessions. Sraer, Chaney, and
Thesmar (2011), for example, use local variations in real estate prices to identify the impact of
firm collateral on investment. They find each extra dollar of collateral increases investment by
$0.06. Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) provide evidence for balance sheet effects in
asset pricing. They show that the marginal investor in mortgage-backed securities is a specialized
intermediary, instead of a diversified representative agent. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2011) use
shocks to the leverage of securities broker-dealers to construct an "intermediary SDF" and use it to
explain asset returns.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup of the model
and the contracting problem. In Section 3 1 characterize the equilibrium and obtain the main results.
In Section 4 I build an economy with a balance sheet channel and solve it numerically. Section 5
concludes.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Setup
Preferences and technology. Consider an economy populated by two types of agents: experts
and consumers. They have the same CRRA preferences over consumption
E 00 e-Pt ct- dt[fo 1-7 t
with discount factor p and relative risk aversion -y. There are two goods: consumption goods and
capital goods, and the only difference between experts and consumers is that experts use capital
more productively. Over a short period of time, if an agent of type i c {c, e} holds ki,t unit of
capital, he produces an output flow in consumption goods
yi,t = (ai - t(gi,t))ki,t
with ai E {ae, ac} and ac < ae, t(gi,t) is the investment in consumption goods required to achieve
the expected growth rate of his his capital gi,t. Capital then evolves over that short period of time2
dk =- gi,tdt + odZt + vdWi,t
ki,t
where Z {Zt E R; Ft, t 2 0} is an aggregate brownian motion, and W = {W-,t; .F, t > 0} an
idiosyncratic brownian motion for expert i, in a probability space (Q, P, F) equipped with a filtration
{-Ft} with the usual conditions.3
Markets. Experts can trade capital continuously at a competitive price pt > 0, which we conjec-
ture follows an Ito process:
dpt 
- p,tdt + op,tdZt
Pt
The price of capital depends on the aggregate shock Z but not on the idiosyncratic shocks {WiEo 1],
and it's determined endogenously in equilibrium. The total value of the aggregate capital stock is
ptkt and it constitutes the total wealth of the economy, since this is the only real asset.
2This formulation where capital is exposed to aggregate risk is equivalent to a standard growth model where
TFP at follows a Brownian Motion. Then if nt is physical capital, kt = atet is "effective capital". To preserve scale
invariance we must also have investment costs proportional to effective capital kt, which makes sense if we think
investment requires diverting capital from consumption to investment (or in a richer model with labor).
3The aggregate shock can be multidimensional, Zt E Rd with d > 2, so the economy could be hit by many
aggregate shocks. There is no loss in intuition from taking d = 1 and focusing on a single aggregate shock.
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There is also a complete financial market 4 with SDF rIt:
rit
Here rt is the risk-free interest rate and 7rt the price of aggregate risk Z. Both are determined en-
dogenously in equilibrium. I am already using the fact that idiosyncratic risks {Wi}El,]1 have price
zero in equilibrium because they can be aggregated away. Even though there is a complete financial
market, agents' access to it will be limited by a moral hazard problem similar to Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2011).
Moral hazard and contracts. Agents can take a private action si,t ("shirking") that reduces
the observable return of capital by that amount, so the observable return from investing a dollar in
capital is
d t (g~t /_t~t 07 a- - t ( gi t )dRt g + pp,t + at + - ' - si,t dt + (a + ap,t) dZe + vdWi,t
t~ [dRk'I
Shirking creates a pecuniary private benefit for the agent per dollar invested in capital ptki,t
d hi, = asi,tdt + psi,tdZt + Asi,tdWi,e
where a E (0, 1) and 3, A > 0, so that shirking is inefficient.5 With A = 0 we would have the
standard setting in moral hazard problems, interpreted as diverting capital to a private account and
obtaining a fraction a per unit diverted, as in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). Here I generalize the
moral hazard to study under which conditions it can create a balance sheet channel. Shirking s may
also expose the agent to aggregate and idiosyncratic risk through the terms 3si,tdZt and Asi,tdWi,t.
This can have several interpretations. Under one interpretation, the agent cannot simply divert
funds to a private account, but can hire an inefficient supplier for the firm. This is costly for the
project and it only benefits him if he secretly acquires some equity in the supplier, exposing himself
to the risk contained therein. Under an alternative interpretation, the fund diversion also increases
the volatility of the observable capital return, but the agent must mask this increase in volatility
with his own funds to avoid being detected. Instead of committing to a moral hazard story, I focus
on the reduced form representation which will be relevant for the balance sheet channel.
At every t, a short-term contract is signed specifying the agent's consumption ci,t, capital ki,t,
growth gi,t, and a payment he will make at time t + dt, contingent on both the aggregate shock
4A complete financial market could be implemented with different asset structures. For example, a natural asset
structure would include risk-free debt, equity in each expert's investments and d market indices to span Z. If d = 1
we can do with only one market index.
5I'll focus on the case where implementing no shirking at all times is optimal, so shirking will not have any direct
effects on the economy, only through incentive provision.
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hitting the economy dZt (which is observable) and his own return6 dRi,t. After this the relationship
is broken up and another contract is signed, and so on. The agent deals with a principal who simply
sells the equilibrium cash flow he receives in the financial market, so the agent can be thought
of as contracting with the market directly. I restrict attention to affine contracts as in He and
Krishnamurthy (2011), which specify a fixed fee fi,tdt and a linear exposure to aggregate risk 0 t,t
and the observable return #i,t. I will focus on the case where it is optimal to implement no shirking
always7 si,t = 0. The agent's budget constraint is
dui,t = ni,trtdt + ptki,t (dR t - rtdt) - fit - 61,tdZe - #i,tptki,tdR t - ci, dt + ptki,t dh
with a standard solvency constraint nt > 0 to make the problem well defined. In order to be taken
by the market, the contract must satisfy a no-arbitrage condition
fit + #1,tptki,tE=0 d R = ,rt (6z,t + #i,tptki,t(o + crp,t))
where the expectation is taken under no shirking (because it is optimal to implement no shirking).
The expected return for the market must cover the cost of the aggregate risk, both from the direct
exposure 6i,t and from the aggregate risk contained in the observable return dR,t. So in terms of
the structural shocks Z and Wi, we obtain the following budget constraint
= (pLn,i,t - ii)dt + oan,,tdZt + &n,i,tdWi,t (3.1)
nit
I#n,i,t rt + pthk,t (Et" [dR~t] - rt) - irti,tptki,t(o, + ap,t) - 7rtOi,t + (a - 1 + #,t)ptkh,tsi,t
n,i,t =(1 - #i,t)ptki,t(o + op,t) - 9 it + ,3ptk,tsi,t
jrn,i,t (1 - #i,t)ptki,tv + Aptki,tsi,t
where the hat denotes the variable is normalized by net worth, e.g. k, Of course in
an incentive compatible contract the agent will chose si,t = 0. Assume the value function for an
agent with net worth n > 0 is V*( t, n) and VC((t, n), for experts and consumers respectively,
for some processes ( = {kt; t > 0} and ( {(t; t > 0} which capture the general equilibrium
investment possibility sets each type of agent faces and follow laws of motion 4 = pg,tdt + ag,tdZt
and = p,tdt + oC,tdZt. Furthermore, assume Ve and V' are strictly increasing and concave in n
6 The contract could also be contingent on the return of other agents R ,t with j #4 i, but there is no loss in
generality from dropping this term, since it will never be optimal to expose the agent to that risk since it doesn't
help with incentives and is costly for him due to risk-aversion.
'When the price of aggregate risk is positive 7rt > 0, the standard argument applies: for a contract with equilibrium
shirking si,t > 0, we could consider instead an alternative contract that just gives the agent the cash flow he gets by
shirking and induces him to not shirk s't = 0. Because shirking is inefficient the new contract leaves the principal
better off.
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and twice continuously differentiable in both arguments. We will later verify this is indeed the case
in equilibrium. For experts, Ve( t, n) must solve the following HJB equation:
pV'(at, n) = max cn + ES=" [dV*( t, n)]
,5,k,g,6,<0 1 - 'Y
where Ei= [dV"(t, n)] = Vn>ny + 2 + 2Ve + V l + Vn&tot + 1 Vn n28g,
-t 2 ll f+ 2 flZt
subject to the budget constraint (3.1) evaluated at s = 0, feasibility constraints , k > 0, and an IC
constraint:
0 E argrmax (_n 1 -pV(x,n) + +E [dV'&n)1
and a transversality condition
lim ePtE [V"( t, nt)| = 0
t->oo
The IC constraint says that, having promised to not shirk (s = 0) it must be optimal for the agent
to in fact not shirk, taking into account that he will act optimally from t + dt on. It boils down to
V.n(a - 1 + #) + (V.'n 2an + Vendoa) / + V,,,n 2 2A ; 0 (3.2)
Notice that if # = A = 0 as in the standard setup, this IC constraint would boil down to 1 -#i,t ;> a:
the agent must keep some "skin in the game" to prevent him from diverting funds. This is precisely
the condition in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012), except that in that paper contracts cannot
be written on the aggregate state of the economy, so 6t = 0 is an additional constraint8 . When
the agent's private action also exposes him to aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, the IC constraint
generalizes to (3.2). Consumers have an analogous problem, with (t taking the place of (t: the only
difference is their productivity is lower ae > ac.
Equilibrium. Denote the set of experts E - [0, 11 and the set of consumers C = (1, 21. We denote
the aggregate capital stock kt and take the initial capital stock ko and its distribution among agents
{ki,o}, {ki,o} as given, with feuc ki,odi = ko. Let ki,o > 0 and kj,o > 0 so that all agents start with
strictly positive net worth.
Definition 23. An equilibrium is a set of aggregate stochastic processes adapted to the filtration
generated by Z: the price of capital {pt}, the state price density {It}, and the aggregate capital
stock {kt}, and a set of stochastic processes for each expert i E E and each consumer i E C (each
adapted to their information'): net worth and wealth {ni,t}, consumption {ci,t}, capital holdings
{ki,t}, growth {gi,t}, and contracts {0i,t,$j,t}, 'such that:
1. Initial net worth satisfies no = poko, for all i e E U C.
8 This is also the case in He and Krishnamurthy (2011)
* The filtration generated by Z and Wi
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2. {ni,t, ci,t, Ogi,,j,t,# /,t} solve agent i's problem, with no,t = pokj,0 for all experts and con-
sumers.
3. Market Clearing:
c ,tdi = (ai - gj,t)ki,tdi
uckitdi k
Euc ((1 - Oi,t ptki,t(- + orp,t) - Oi,t) di = ptkt(o- + ap,t)
4. Law of motion of aggregate capital:
dkt = (L gi,tki,tdi) dt + ktodZt
The market clearing conditions for the consumer goods and capital market are standard. The
condition for market clearing in the financial market is derived as follows. Each agent sells a cash
flow with loading #5,tptkj,t(o + -p,t) + Oi,t on the aggregate shock dZt and loading #i,tptkj,tv on his
own idiosyncratic shock dWi,t. We can aggregate these securities into a market index eliminating
the idiosyncratic risk, and if we normalize it so that is has an identity loading on aggregate risk,
there is a total supply feuC #,tptki,t(a + op,t) + O,tdi of this market index, which is in zero net
demand. We obtain feuC on,i,tdi = uC ptki,t (o + o-p,t) di = ptkt (o, + o-p,t) as desired. By Walras'
law, the market for risk-free debt clears automatically.
3.3 Solving the model
3.3.1 First best with no moral hazard.
If the private action is actually observable and contractible, we can set si,t = 0 and forget about
the IC constraint. We obtain a standard AK growth model where the distribution of wealth doesn't
play any role'0 and therefore the is no balance sheet channel. Experts hold all the capital in the
economy and there is perfect risk-sharing. Idiosyncratic risk is aggregated away, and aggregate risk
is shared proportionally to net worth.
Proposition 24 (First Best). If p -(1 -7Y)g* + (1 - a) o > 0 and without any financial frictions,
there is a stationary growth equilibrium, where the price of capital is p* and the growth rate g*, given
by:
L' (g*) = p* (3.3)
p (( (3a4 - t(g*).4)
p - (1t-o)g* + (1d-Y7) 0ou
ioExcept to determine consumption, of course.
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Proof. Without any financial frictions, idiosyncratic risk can be perfectly shared and has zero price
in equilibrium. Capital will be held by experts who are more productive and must be priced by
arbitrage
a -t (git) (3_5git + Itpt + 90top + t - rt = rt ( + p,t) (3.5)
Pt
The growth rate g is pinned down by the static FOC
I' (gi,t) - Pt
and experts face the same portfolio problem as consumers. We have, in effect, a standard represen-
tative agent model with a stationary growth path with risk-free interest rate:
1
rt = p+ -ygt - - (1 +-y)0y22
and price of aggregate risk
lrt ='Yoa
In a stationary equilibrium the price of capital is constant so we have pp,t = op,t = 0, and replacing
all of this in (3.5) gives (3.4). For the agents' problem to be well defined we need p - (1 - 7y)g* +
(1 - y) 2. 2 > 0, since otherwise they could achieve infinite utility. E
This result relies on the assumption of complete financial markets. This allows experts to hold
all the capital in the economy (they are more productive) while holding no idiosyncratic risk and
a fraction of aggregate risk just proportional to their net worth. We can imagine them financing
their operation using all equity. Their equity gets aggregated into a market index, which is then
used by experts and consumers to share aggregate risk. In order to create a balance sheet channel,
aggregate risk-sharing must be prevented or distorted. I now introduce moral hazard to study when
it can help create a balance sheet channel.
3.3.2 Moral hazard
When the private action is not contractible, the IC constraint creates a financial friction. Conjecture
that the value function of experts takes the form
V* ((t , n)=
where the process ( follows
= pg,tdt + oatdZt
and captures the stochastic investment possibility sets the expert faces. A high (t means investment
possibility sets are favorable and a lot of utility out of his net worth.
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The expert's HJB then takes the following form (dropping the i subscript for simplicity)
p= -max + ((tn)'-( pn + p,t - 2- , + (1 - 7nt- ) (3.6)
- 2k~,94 - 72 2 2
subject to -, k > 0 and
dn (pn - a)dt + ondZt + &ndW (3.7)
n
pn rt + pti (E-" [dfRk - rt) - irtkptki(a + Op,t) -- it
On = (1 -#)ptk(o +op,t) -
&n =(1 -#)ptkv
and IC constraint
(a - 1 + #) + ((1-7)t - Yan)# - 7nA < 0 (3.8)
with the transversality condition limt, 0 e-PtE [(-Y~L"_] 0. Notice the net worth n drops from
the HJB, so the optimal policy {, /, g, , } does not depend on the agent's net worth. An expert
with twice the net worth will get twice the consumption and capital, and his contract will also be
scaled up proportionally (so he will have the same # and 0). The growth rate of his capital g will
be the same however, given by the static first order condition
t'(g) = pt
This is a standard Tobin's q condition: the marginal cost of creating an extra unit of capital is
equal to its market price. Consumers have an analogous HJB and the same linearity property and
the same FOC for growth.
Lemma 25. [Linearity] Growth is determined by a static FOC
t' (gt) = pt
the same for all agents. In addition, all experts chose the same {Re, ke, e, #e} and all consumers
the same {c, e c #
This result allows us to simplify the state space. We don't need to keep track of the whole
distribution of net worth across experts and consumers. We can instead focus on a single ratio of
aggregate expert to consumers wealth:
Nt
Xt = E (0, 1)
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We then look for a Markov equilibrium in xt
pt p ), = t (x ) , It = ( (Xt) , rt = r (xt) , rt = I (xt) , #t = ' (xt)
where @(x) E [0, 1] is the fraction of aggregate capital managed by experts. We have a recursive
definition for equilibrium:
Definition 26. A Markov Equilibrium is a set of aggregate functions (p,, (, r, ,@ , g (x) and policy
functions (he, 5e, Oe, 4c)(x) for experts and (ec, 0 , c)(x) for consumers, and a law of motion for
the aggregate state variable dxt tx(x)dt + ax(x)dZt such that:
1) and ( solve the experts' and consumers' HJB equations, and (&e, ke, g, Se, 4e) and (6, kc, e g, Gc, $c)
are the corresponding policy functions, taking {p, r, ir, V) } and the law of motion of x as given.
2) Market Clearing:
exp + c(1-x) p = @~ae + (1 - @)ac - t(g)
ke = c -,h
px p(l - x)
(#e4 + #c(1 - 0) (O + up) + OeX + 0c (1 - X) = 0
3) The law of motion for x is derived from experts' and consumers' policy functions
- =Pn,e - ce - g - pp - o-pO + (9p + O) - On,e(O + Up)
- n,e - U - Op
The recursive definition of equilibrium abstracts from the aggregate effective capital stock. Given
the recursive equilibrium we can compute the law of motion of kt and recover all the elements of the
non-recursive definition of equilibrium. The state variable x captures the health of balance sheets.
In the first best without moral hazard, experts should hold all the capital in the economy. However,
when x is low, experts' aggregate net worth is small relative to the value of the capital stock of
the economy, so they offload capital onto consumers who are less productive. This drives the price
of capital and growth down and reduces output. In this sense, balance sheets have real effects.
However, in order to have a balance sheet channel, we need the endogenous state variable x which
captures the health of balance sheets to be exposed to aggregate risk, so that when a negative shock
hits the economy it is amplified by weakened balance sheets. Since x is the only state variable for
this economy, this requires u,(x) > 0.
Definition 27. We say balance sheets have real effects if equilibrium objects depend on x.
We say there is a balance sheet channel if balance sheets have real effects and, in addition, the
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endogenous state variable x is exposed to aggregate shocks, i.e.: ax > 0.
Aggregate risk sharing. The FOC for 0 are
Ir = 'n,e - (1 - )a + Xe7/
for the expert, where Xe is the Lagrange multiplier on the IC constraint. The expert can trade
aggregate risk at price 7r. Increasing his exposure to aggregate risk is costly because he is risk
averse, captured by the term -y,, and because the value he gets out of a dollar ( might be
correlated with the aggregate state of the economy (intertemporal hedging motive). In addition,
by taking aggregate risk he can relax his IC constraint: intuitively, if he is very highly exposed
to aggregate risk through 0 he won't want to shirk, which further exposes him to aggregate risk
through pk#s. For consumers, we have an analogous equation:
7r = 17n,c - (1 - 7)0z + XcY#
Putting the two together and using the market clearing condition in the financial market we get the
following expression:
relative hedging wedge Q
This equation says that experts will take, proportionally to their net worth, an exposure to aggregate
risk equal to the total volatility of aggregate wealth or + op, plus a relative hedging motive term
(1 - x) 1- (o-g - oC) plus an incentive provision term (1 - x) 3 (Xc - Xe). The first term just reflects
the fact that both experts and consumers are equally risk averse, so they will split total volatility
proportionally to their net worth. However, since they face different problems (experts are more
productive) the value of a dollar for experts is bigger than for consumers, and the gap between
them is not constant: it changes in response to aggregate shocks. This creates a relative hedging
motive: if -y < 1 experts want to have more net worth when the gap is bigger, to take advantage
of better investment possibility sets (low price of capital, etc.). This is sometimes called "keeping
dry-powder" effect. On the other hand, if agents are risk averse, they want to stabilize their utility
across states. If 'y> 1 the wealth effect dominates and they want to have more net worth when the
gap between experts and consumers is small and they need more net worth to achieve any given
level of utility (relative to consumers).
Finally, I call Q = #(Xc - Xe) the aggregate risk-sharing wedge created by moral hazard. Both
experts and consumers want to take on aggregate risk in order to relax their IC constraints. By
distorting their aggregate risk-sharing they are able to improve their idiosyncratic risk-sharing. This
tradeoff between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk-sharing is at the core of the mechanism that can
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create a balance sheet channel.
Using Ito's lemma to compute a = , and o = C'u, and using the definition of a =
x(ore - a - o) we get the following expression for the exposure to aggregate risk of the endogenous
state variable x.
Lemma 28. The volatility of the endogenous state variable x, is given by
oX = (1 - x)x (3.10)
1 -(1 - x)x1- 
-
This result makes clear that what is requires for a balance sheet channel is a positive wedge
Q>0.
Proposition 29. A balance sheet channel with ax # 0 can only appear if shirking increases agents'
private exposure to aggregate risk, i.e.: # > 0.
Corollary. In the standard moral hazard setting with 3 = A = 0, there is no balance sheet channel.
Recall a balance sheet channel requires o-x # 0. This can only happen if aggregate risk sharing is
distorted by the moral hazard wedge Q. A non-zero a requires that the first best risk-sharing where
each agent takes a proportional fraction of aggregate risk be distorted. In principle, this distortion
can come from an endogenous relative hedging motive -2 (og - ow), but the relative hedging motive
is endogenous: without a balance sheet channel there wouldn't be a hedging motive to distort
aggregate risk-sharing, and therefore no balance sheet channel. The moral hazard wedge, instead,
may appear even without a balance sheet channel, therefore creating a distortion in aggregate risk-
sharing that induces a balance sheet channel. This balance sheet channel will in turn create a relative
hedging motive which may amplify it. But the initial impetus must come from the moral hazard
wedge. In the standard moral hazard setup, where shirking is interpreted as stealing and does not
affect the agent's exposure to aggregate risk, there can't be a balance sheet channel. Furthermore,
notice it's the impact of the private action on the exposure to aggregate risk 3 what matters, not
idiosyncratic risk A.
Having # > 0 is not sufficient, however. We also need the IC constraint to be binding differently
for experts and consumers (as captured by the difference in the Lagrange multipliers). This makes
sense, they can't both increase their exposure to aggregate risk to relax their IC constraints, so
what matters is who has the strongest incentives to do so. A particular case where a balance sheet
will not appear, even with # > 0 is if contracts on the observable return are not allowed at all (no
equity issuance). Then e =# = 0 and the IC constraint is not binding for either type (they are
residual claimants), so the wedge Q = #(Xc - Xe) = 0.
Proposition 30. If contracts cannot be written on the agent's return ($e - 0) then there
won't be a balance sheet channel: a =0.
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3.4 Building an economy with a balance sheet channel
I make the following assumptions to simplify the model. First, log preferences will eliminate the
relative hedging motive and avoid the need to actually solve for ((x) and ((x). Since the impact of
shirking on idiosyncratic risk doesn't play an important role, set A = 0 to get an IC constraint:
a - 1+ # - oa# 0 (3.11)
In the first best the agent would want to set on = o + o, = o and # 1, so for a binding moral
hazard problem we will need a - o#, > 0. Set g = t = 0, abstracting from growth. Finally, to obtain
a stationary distribution, introduce retirement: with Poisson intensity T agents die. New agents are
born to keep the population constant and they inherit the wealth of dying agents. By distributing
this wealth unequally between new experts and consumers we can induce a drift in the direction of
some t E (0, 1). The drift of x gets a new term r (. - x). If we interpret p = + r as the sum of
the real discount factor p > 0 and the arrival rate of death r > 0 we don't need to change the HJB
equations.
First Best with no moral hazard. The first best without moral hazard has all capital held
by experts O(x) = 1, and full idiosyncratic risk sharing e(x) = 1. Balance sheets don't have real
effects, and furthermore aggregate risk is shared proportionally to net worth, on,e on,c = o. The
price of capital is constant p* = g, and the price of aggregate risk is given by 7r* =o.
Moral hazard. The economy with moral hazard can be understood using three main equations.
First, using the FOC for # and $, and the IC constraint itself we get
1 - # = 1+2 (3.12)
1 +- (ph~I~v)2
The fraction of their equity the agent keeps 1 - #/ depends on the equilibrium price of risk 7r, and on
the fraction of his net worth he invests in capital pk. The more he invests in capital, the larger the
idiosyncratic risk he will face other things equal, so he has more incentives to offload his return on
the market, even at the cost of increasing his exposure to aggregate risk to satisfy the IC constraint.
The numerator should be positive if the IC constraint is binding, and less than 1 if implementing
s = 0 is optimalil so 1 - # E (0, 1).
Second, experts are more productive than consumers, so they will want to hold more capital,
proportionally to their net worth. Using the FOC for k and 0 we obtain the following condition
ai
- + p + oa, - r < 7r(o + ap) + 7Ipki ((1 - #3)v)2 (3.13)p
"The net benefit for the contract of a positive s is (a - 1 - 7r#6) s and we want it to be _< 0 for s =0 to be optimal.
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with equality if k > 0. Experts find capital more attractive, so in equilibrium they will always
demand some capital12, ke,t > kt > 0. So we get the following pricing equation for capital using
the market clearing conditions in the capital market and the above condition for experts (who must
always hold some capital, otherwise consumers wouldn't hold capital either)
a. p + aur - r = r(o + op) + '((1 - ))214)
p x
As a consequence of expert's higher productivity with capital, ac > ac, they will hold more capital
and will therefore face, other things equal, more idiosyncratic risk. They will then sell more equity
than consumers, as per (3.12), and in order to satisfy their IC constraint will take on more aggregate
risk. This leads to the third equation, for the wedge Q - (Xc - Xe). Using the FOC for # and the
0 we get an expression for Xi, plug it into the expression for Q and use (3.12) to obtain:
Q = #e - #c > 0 (3.15)
and the volatility of the endogenous state variable ax is then
x, = O (1 - x) > 0 (3.16)
Putting these three relationships together we get the following picture: experts, being more produc-
tive than consumers, want to hold more capital proportionally to their net worth. They consequently
face more idiosyncratic risk so they want to offload a larger fraction of their return on the market.
To continue credibly promising s = 0 they must instead distort their aggregate risk-sharing more
than consumers, so a positive aggregate risk-sharing wedge arises Q > 0, giving x a positive loading
on the aggregate shock: ax > 0. When the economy gets hit by a negative shock, experts will loose
net worth more than proportionally and the fraction of total wealth belonging to them x will fall.
This is what will drive the dynamics of the model.
Because experts are more productive than consumers, when they are very wealthy they will hold
all the capital in the economy, O(x) = 1 for x > ,. When x falls below this value, they will starts
offloading capital onto consumers, and @)(x) will fall below 1. From the FOC and market clearing
condition for consumption, we get
pp - ac
ae - ac
So when x > , the price of capital is at its first best p(x) = p* = a for x > i, and as O(x) falls with
x, the price of capital falls as well. When x -+ 0, O(x) -+ 0 and the price of capital approaches its
lower bound p(x) -+ p = ', the value if consumers had to hold it forever. Using the IC constraint
1 2 The equation has the right hand side increasing in k after we substitute 1 - 0j.
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Figure 3-1: The price of capital p and the fraction managed by experts 4) as a function of x.
and market clearing in the financial market we get, along with Un,e = 0n,c + Q we get
a + p + Q(1 - X) = + -- (3.17)1 1 3
Use Ito's lemma to obtain up = - ex and plug into (3.17) the formula for Q, #e = _ -
and # 1 - to obtain an first order ODE for the price of capital p(x). Since in the
-(X_2#)
region x > s the price of capital p = g, we also know p'(x) = 0 and (3.17) becomes an equation
for ir(x) = fr(x) for x > s. We can then find : as the point where consumers start to buy capital
by using their condition for demand for capital (3.13) with an equality. Re-arranging we get:
1 (-r# + a) 2  2 ae -ac
(1 + &#j/)22 
P
This pins down s E [0, 11. If the equation does not have a solution in [0, 1] it means that either
& 0 (experts always hold all capital) or 1 1 (experts never hold all the capital stock). Focus
on the case with an interior solution. Now use the pricing equation for capital (3.14), together with
4) = -acto find the price of aggregate risk ir as a function of x and p, and hence Q, a, and #e
ae -ac
as functions of x and p. We can then solve (3.17) with boundary condition p(±) = . To check
that this is, in fact, an equilibrium we need to make sure that for all x, the IC constraint is binding
a - 7r# > 0 and that implementing s = 0 is optimal a - 7r# - 1 < 0.
Numerical solution. I use the following parameter values for the numerical solution. Expert
productivity is ae = 1, while consumers have ac = 0.5. The discount factor is p = 0.05 and the
volatility of capital is o = 0.02 and v - 0.3. The moral hazard comes from a - 0.5 and # - 0.3.
With these values, the first best value of capital is p* = = 20. The lowest possible value forP
capital, corresponding to consumers holding it forever is q = ' = 10.p
Figure 3-1 shows the price of capital for different values of x and the fraction of capital managed
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Figure 3-2: The volatility a, and drift p of the state variable x and the aggregate risk-sharing
wedge Q
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Figure 3-3: The price of aggregate risk r, the total aggregate risk in the economy cr, + a and the
risk-free interest rate r.
by experts. Both increase with x, until we reach J when all capital is held by experts and the price
reaches its first best level. Also, in this case p(O) = = 10. This figure by itself is not surprising:p
with moral hazard or other contractual frictions, a positive relationship between x and the price of
capital will emerge even if there is no balance sheet channel. We need to look at the dynamics of x.
Figure 3-2 shows the drift and volatility of x, as well as the aggregate risk-sharing wedge Q
which underlies them. Notice how the volatility ox vanishes at both borders even though the wedge
Q is bounded away from zero. The drift p is positive at x = 0 and negative at x = 1, pushing
the system towards the interior of the domain (this is because agents retire). The upper and lower
boundaries x = 0 and x = 1 are Feller entry boundaries: the system could start there and would
immediately move to the interior, but they can never be reached if xo starts in the interior.
Figure 3-3 shows the price of aggregate risk and the total amount of aggregate risk in the
economy o + op. Somewhat surprisingly, the price of aggregate risk initially drops as we move away
from x = 1. This is because the incentives to distort aggregate risk-sharing increase faster than
the total amount of aggregate risk initially. Both agents want to be "over-exposed" to aggregate
risk, driving the price down. The slope of ir eventually turns around as x falls further and the total
aggregate volatility in the economy increases. Another surprising feature of the equilibrium is that
the risk-free interest rate rises as x -+ 0, in contrast to other models of balance sheet recessions
where the interest rate drops as agents demand more safe assets. The reason is that risky assets are
demanded when x is low to provide incentives and improve idiosyncratic risk sharing. Total market
volatility, a + op meanwhile, increases as x falls, but eventually comes back down as ax approaches
0.
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3.5 Conclusions
In this paper I have shown how moral hazard can help explain balance sheet recessions. I first show
that it standard models of balance sheet recessions, even if financial frictions are derived from a
moral hazard problem, optimal contracts allow agents to share aggregate risk and this eliminates
the balance sheet channel. The reason for this is that in order to have incentives to not shirk, agents
need to have some "skin in the game" and be exposed to their own observable return. This exposes
them to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, but since there private action does not interact
with aggregate risk, there is no need to distort aggregate risk-sharing to provide incentives. In
equilibrium, this eliminates the balance sheet channel: experts and consumers share aggregate risk
proportionally to their net worth, so that when a negative shock hits the economy, everyone loses net
worth proportionally, and there is no amplification through weaker balance sheets. In consequence,
investment possibility sets are not affected by the aggregate shock and therefore agents don't have
any intertemporal hedging motives which could distort proportional aggregate risk-sharing.
I then generalized the moral hazard setup to allow the agent's private action (shirking) to also
expose him to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. This can be interpreted as a reduced form
representation of a richer game. I show that a balance sheet channel may appear only if shirking
exposes the agent to aggregate risk through his private benefit. By "over-exposing" the agent to
aggregate risk the contract can deter him from taking a private action that further exposes him
to aggregate risk. A tradeoff between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk-sharing arises: the contact
can reduce the agent's equity holdings which expose him to idiosyncratic risk by increasing his
exposure to aggregate risk. Since experts are more productive than consumers, they find capital
more attractive and will want to leverage. They will therefore have a larger exposure to idiosyncratic
risk than consumers, other things equal, and will have larger incentives to reduce their equity stakes,
even at the price of taking on more aggregate risk. A wedge is aggregate risk-sharing will therefore
arise where more productive experts will take on a disproportionate fraction of aggregate risk. When
a negative shock hits the economy, their balance sheets will be hit harder. This will amplify and
propagate the shock, forcing them to offload assets onto less productive consumers and reducing
asset prices and output. This is the balance sheet channel.
90
Bibliography
ADRIAN, T., AND N. BOYARCHENKO (2012): "Intermediary Leverage Cycles and Financial Stabil-
ity," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 567.
ADRIAN, T., E. ETULA, AND T. MUIR (2011): "Broker-Dealer Leverage and the Cross Section of
Stock Returns," working paper.
ANGELETOS, M. (2006): "Uninsured Idiosyncratic Investment Risk and Aggregate Saving," forth-
coming in Review of Economic Dynamics.
BACHMANN, R., AND G. MOSCARINI (2011): "Business Cycles and Endogenous Uncertainty," work-
ing paper.
BANSAL, R., D. KIKU, I. SHALIASTOVICH, AND A. YARON (2012): "Volatility, the Macroeconomy,
and Asset Prices," NBER working paper 18104.
BANSAL, R., AND A. YARON (2004): "Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset
Pricing Puzzles," The Journal of Finance, 59(4), pp. 1481-1509.
BERNANKE, B., AND M. GERTLER (1989): "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations,"
The American Economic Review, 79(1), pp. 14-31.
BERNANKE, B., M. GERTLER, AND S. GILCHRIST (1999): 'The Financial Accelerator in a Quantita-
tive Business Cycle Framework," in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. Taylor, and M. Wood-
ford, vol. 1, chap. 21, pp. 1341-1393. Elsevier.
BLOOM, N. (2009): "The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks," Econometrica, 77(3), pp. 623-685.
BLOOM, N., M. FLOETOTTO, N. JAIMOVICH, I. SAPORTA-EKSTEN, AND S. TERRY (2012): "Real
Uncertain Business Cycles," NBER working paper 18245.
BRUNNERMEIER, M., AND L. PEDERSEN (2009): "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," Review
of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2201 - 38.
BRUNNERMEIER, M., AND Y. SANNIKOV (2012): "A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sec-
tor," working paper, Princeton University.
91
BUERA, F., AND B. MOLL (2012): "Aggregate implications of a Credit Crunch," working paper.
CAMPBELL, J., AND J. BEELER (2009): "The Long-Run Risks Model and Aggregate Asset Prices:
An Empirical Assessment," NBER.
CAMPBELL, J., AND J. COCHRANE (1999): "By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Explanation
of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 107(2), 205-251.
CAMPBELL, J. Y., S. GIGLIO, C. POLK, AND R. TURLEY (2012): "An Intertemporal CAPM with
Stochastic Volatility," working paper.
CAMPBELL, J. Y., M. LETTAU, B. G. MALKIEL, AND Y. Xu (2001): "Have Individual Stocks
Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk," The Journal of Finance,
56(1), pp. 1-43.
CHRISTIANO, L., R. MOTTO, AND M. ROSTAGNO (2012): "Risk Shocks," working paper.
COOLEY, T., V. QUADRINI, AND R. MARIMON (2004): "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Con-
tract Enforceability," Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 817-847.
Cox, J., AND C. HUANG (1989): "Optimum Portfolio and Consumption Policies when Asset Prices
Follow a Diffusion Process," Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 33-83.
DEMARZO, P. M., AND M. FISHMAN (2007): "Optimal Long Term Financial Contracting," Review
of Financial Studies, 20, 2079-127.
DEMARZO, P. M., Z. HE, M. FISHMAN, AND N. WANG (2012): "Dynamic Agency Theory meets
the Q-Theory of Investment," forthcoming.
DEMARZO, P. M., AND Y. SANNIKOV (2006): "Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital
Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model," The Journal of Finance, 61(6), pp. 2681-2724.
Di TELLA, S. (2012): "Moral Hazard and Aggregate Risk-Sharing," working paper.
(2013): "Uncertainty Shocks and Balance Sheet Recessions," MIT working paper.
DIAMOND, D., AND R. RAJAN (2011): "Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze," QJE, forthcoming.
DUFFIE, D., AND L. G. EPSTEIN (1992): "Stochastic Differential Utility," Econometrica, 60(2), pp.
353-394.
EDMANS, A., AND X. GABAIX (2011): "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," Review of Financial
Studies, 24(9), 2865 - 2892.
EDMANS, A., X. GABAIX, T. SADZIK, AND Y. SANNIKOV (2011): "Dynamic CEO Compensation,"
working paper University of Pennsylvania.
92
EGGERTSSON, G., AND P. KRUGMAN (2010): "Debt, Deleveragin, and the Liquidity Trap: A
Fisher-Minsky-Koo approach," working paper.
FERNANDEZ-VILLAVERDE, J., AND J. RUBIO-RAMfREZ (2010): "Macroeconomics and Volatility:
Data, Models, and Estimation," NBER working paper 16618.
FERNANDEZ-VILLAVERDE, J., J. RUBIO-RAMfREZ, A. GUERRON-QUINTANA, AND M. URIBE
(2011): "Risk Matters: The Real Effects of Volatility Shocks," American Economic Review, 101(6),
2530-2561.
FISHER, I. (1933): "The Debt-Deflation Theory of of Great Depressions," Econometrica, 1(7), 337-
357.
GABAIX, X., A. KRISHNAMURTHY, AND 0. VIGNERON (2007): "Limits of Arbitrage: Theory
and Evidence from the Mortgage-Backed Securities Market," The Journal of Finance, 62(2), pp.
557-595.
GEANAKOPLOS, J. (2009): "The Leverage Cycle," in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, ed. by K. R.
Daron Acemoglu, and M. Woodford, vol. 24, pp. 1-65.
GRUBER, J. (2006): "A Tax-Based Estimate of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution," NBER
working paper.
GUERRIERI, V., AND G. LORENZONI (2011): "Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings, and the Liq-
uidity Trap," working paper.
HALDANE, A. (2012): "The Dog and the Frisbee," Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's 36th
economic policy symposium.
HE, Z., AND A. KRISHNAMURTHY (2011): "A Model of Capital and Crises," forthcoming, Review
of Economic Studies.
HOLMSTROM, B., AND J. TIROLE (1996): "Modeling Aggregate Liquidity," The American Economic
Review, 86(2), pp. 187-191.
KARATZAS, I., AND S. SHREVE (1998): Methods of Mathematical Finance. Springer.
KIYOTAKI, N., M. GERTLER, AND A. QUERALTO (2011): "Financial Crises, Bank Risk Exposure
and Financial Crises, Bank Risk Exposure and Government Financial Policy," working paper
NYU and Princeton.
KIYOTAKI, N., AND J. MOORE (1997): "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, 105, 211-248.
KRISHNAMURTHY, A. (2003): "Collateral Constraints and the Amplification Mechanism," Journal
of Economic Theory, 111(2), 277-292.
93
MERTON, R. (1973): "An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model," Econometrica, 41(5), 867-
887.
MYERSON, R. (2012): "A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles," .
RAMPINI, A., A. SUFI, AND S. VISWANATHAN (2012): "Dynamic Risk Management," working
paper.
SANNIKOV, Y. (2008): "A Continuous- Time Version of the Principal: Agent Problem," The Review
of Economic Studies, 75(3), pp. 957-984.
SHLEIFER, A., AND R. W. VISHNY (1992): "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market
Equilibrium Approach," The Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1343 - 1366.
SRAER, D., T. CHANEY, AND D. THESMAR (2011): "The Collateral Channel: The Collateral
Channel: How Real Estate Shocks affect Corporate Investment," working paper.
STRULOVICI, B. (2011): "Contracts, Information Persistence, and Renegotiation," working paper.
94
